Cablegrams 123, 36 CANBERRA, 2 March 1949, 5.35 p.m.
IMMEDIATE SECRET
1. Since our previous message [1] Dutch statement and actions have
given less cause for giving them any benefit of doubt with respect
to their intentions in holding the conference at The Hague. The
considerations set out in that telegram still apply, that is, the
standing of the United Nations and the undoubted influence it has
had up to date and related to that the difficulties which might be
created for the United Nations if the position is arrived at where
compelling action should be taken but for any reason is not taken.
At the same time there are certain basic requirements on which
there can be no compromise on tactical grounds. For example, the
release with complete freedom of all leaders and, in fact, the
thousand other political prisoners held by the Dutch, and the
restoration of the Government would seem to be a condition on
which there is no room for compromise of any description.
2. The position seems to be that the Commission has reported [2]
as strongly as it could on the defiance of the Security Council
and asks the Council's direction. There is a primary
responsibility on the United States to take the initiative in some
form of compelling action executed by all members of the United
Nations, by those which can take the most effective action, or by
a regional group, whichever seems desirable to the Council. As a
last resort if compelling action is vetoed or obstructed for any
other reason the least that can be expected is a decision to hold
the conference under the jurisdiction of the Commission with a
view to implementing the Council's decisions and the Council's
recommendations. [3] Where that Commission meets is of little
importance, although New York would seem to be a better location
than either Batavia or The Hague.
3. The attitudes of the United Kingdom, the United States and the
Delhi group cannot at the moment be assessed. Clearly the United
Kingdom regard Dutch action as sufficient compliance to argue
against compelling action. We for our part do not wish to weaken
our stand except insofar as some form of compromise might seem to
be necessary rather than have our whole objective defeated. For
these reasons a 'wait and see' game should be played for the time
being except that we should continue to advocate the carrying out
of the United Nations decisions. Any statement that is made should
be confined to the observations that the Commission has reported
that the Council's decision has been defied, that Australian
policy is based on complete support for the United Nations which
involves whole-hearted support for all its decisions, and that the
obligation for action now rests on the Council and not the
Commission, the Commission having reported failure by the Dutch to
comply with the Council's directions.
4. This is a most difficult situation to assess from the point of
view of tactics and perhaps you may wish to discuss on the phone
in the light of your information.
[AA : A1838, 403/2/3/2, iii]