Ministerial Dispatch Hag 36/49 (extract) THE HAGUE, 1 March 1949

CONFIDENTIAL

[matter omitted]

6. In regard to Indonesia, Dr. Valentine stressed that he was
merely speaking in his personal capacity. His remarks were
nevertheless widely accepted as an expression of the United States
Government viewpoint especially in regard to the international
implications of the second Dutch police action. He pointed out
that the Dutch must have been fully aware of the international
difficulties which would be created by their policy and since
there could have been little cause for misunderstanding as to what
the reactions of various other nations could be, there could now
be little justification for anger or dismay. To give way to either
emotion would be to postpone ultimate understanding and solution.

Emotional heat, he continued, rarely created light. If world
opinion could be convinced not only by verbal assurances from the
Netherlands, but very promptly and beyond question by its actions,
that its objectives in Indonesia were those of all peace and
freedom loving nations, much of the heat would go out of the
argument and understanding would be in sight.

7. The wisdom of Dr. Valentine's observations made less impression
on the public mind than the fear that strong United States
disapproval might result in a suspension of aid to the Netherlands
under the Marshall plan. Nevertheless indignation at the allegedly
high handed interference of the United Nations with the
economically 'imperialistic' United States as prime meddler in
Holland's domestic affairs still appeared to prevail over
appreciation for benefits received or the nation's traditional
financial caution. In fact, both the United States and Australia
were attributed with the basest commercial motives for their
policy and the first publication of news of the so-called 'Fox
Contract' [1] was greeted editorially with expressions of pious
horror that such shameless commercial duplicity could exist.

8. Throughout the Netherlands the confusion felt at the course of
events in Indonesia by most sections of the population found its
outlet in bitterly expressed resentment of the alleged
interference from the outside world described in the previous
paragraph of this despatch. While the conservatives (notably the
Anti-Revolutionaries) were rejoicing that at last strong and
apparently effective action was being taken against the Indonesian
Republic, the more liberal elements in political life were not
equally complacent. On 17th January the Party of Labour held a
meeting in Amsterdam which adopted a resolution urging the
granting of freedom of movement to the Republican leaders,
restoration of the Republic and the transfer of power to a Federal
Government. An A.N.P. translation of the text of this resolution
is attached as Annexure 'A'. [2] Further disquiet was caused at
the publication of the report [3] by the United Nations Committee
of Good Offices on the conditions under which members of the
Republican Government were interned on Bangka Island. The failure
of the Dutch officials on Bangka to carry out instructions
regarding the comfort of their charges and in particular their
free movement on the island itself, was the subject of much bitter
comment and the Dutch public at large felt that they had lost
prestige in international eyes and had been badly let down by
their colonial administration in Indonesia.

9. As the police action continued, a war of communiques kept pace.

Although the end of the Sumatra fighting was announced early in
the month, it was difficult to obtain any picture of the more
vital military and political situation in Java from the accounts
of individual incidents put out by Lieut.-General Spoor's
headquarters in Batavia. In an interview published in Batavia on
20th Jan. the Netherlands Army Commander said that he hoped that
'temporary insecurity would last considerably less than three
months'. He called this temporary insecurity a logical result of
the beginning of the 'mopping up phase' of operations by the
Netherlands forces and claimed that it would serve no useful
purpose to split the army into small groups in order to keep
'static guard'. The counter claims of military success, or at
least of Dutch frustration by guerilla tactics, put forward by
Indonesian representatives received more support from a report [4]
by the military observers of the Good Offices Committee than did
the optimistic pronouncements from Dutch headquarters. This report
was not appreciated by the Netherlands Government which went to
some pains to try and prove that it presented a 'strongly coloured
picture, generally giving the impression that it is not free from
partiality'.

10. As an evidence of the Netherlands Government's concern at the
situation the Prime Minister, Dr. W. Drees, left on January 4th
for Batavia, where he was met by the Netherlands Ambassador in
London, Jhr. Dr. Michiels van Verduynen, who had flown out several
days previously. The Prime Minister's visit was brief and confined
to consultations with the High Representative of the Crown, Dr.

Louis Beel, the Batavia officials and a section of the
Federalists. Although there had been some vaguely expressed hopes
of his making significant contact with the Republicans, local
discouragements apparently proved too strong, and he did not visit
Jokjakarta. In a press statement made before his departure for
Holland on 20th January, he did however stress the importance of
the Republic in the projected Indonesian Federal Government. This
statement is attached as Annexure 'B'.

11. The announcement by the Indian Government of its intention to
call a conference at New Delhi on the Indonesian question was
followed by speculation as to whether Australia would accept an
invitation to attend. The Australian decision to be represented by
officers of the Department of External Affairs drew critical
comment from a number of Dutch papers. The more moderate
journalists noted in sorrow rather than in anger that no heed was
paid to the Dutch point of view but took some comfort from the
fact that no immediate action against Holland was decided upon. As
might be expected, Trouw (Anti-Revolutionary) was particularly
bitter and after attempting to ridicule the New Delhi meeting as a
whole, referred to Australia as 'the crypto-Communist State in the
South Pacific' which had succeeded in exterminating practically
all its native population.

12. The debate in the Security Council, of which you will have
received full reports from New York, increased the exasperation of
Trouw. Commenting on the proposal to turn the Good Offices
Committee into a full Commission, this newspaper said: 'What the
Americans want boils down to restoring the Republican leaders as
rulers of the Republic and transforming the Good Offices Committee
into a United Nations Commission which would exercise authority in
the whole of Indonesia thus substantially replacing the Dutch
authority. Thus leadership would be replaced by a United Nations
Commission, that is to say-America with Australia as right hand
man.'
13. The publication of the draft Resolution on Indonesia submitted
to the Security Council on Friday 21st January also resulted in a
sharp press reaction.

Algemeen Handelsblad, urging that the draft would need revision if
it were to become acceptable to Holland, pointed out that the
Resolution specifically recognised Holland's sovereignty by
referring to its transfer; the Security Council would also have to
respect this sovereignty. The Socialist Vrije Volk urged the
proposers of the Resolution to study the results of Dr. Drees's
journey to Indonesia. 'They might then see that they are one step
behind and that the dispute between Holland and the Republic is no
longer in the foreground. It is now a question of agreement being
reached between the Indonesians themselves on a Government for the
whole of Indonesia and of joint agreement on the establishment of
a union with Holland.'
14. From the Government side, criticism of the Resolution was also
forthcoming. At a dinner following upon the annual meeting of the
Netherlands Foreign Press Association, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Stikker, forecast a breakdown of law and order if the
Resolution were accepted. 'The intervention of the United Nations
in the international field has shown that, at the present stage of
international organisation, there does not exist such a thing as
effective administration by the United Nations, because the United
Nations had no army, no navy, no air force and no police.' The
passing of the Resolution [5] on 28th January drew protests from
the Netherlands representative on the Security Council, Dr. van
Royen, and again the official Dutch theme was that of illegitimate
interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation.