Departmental Dispatch 8 OTTAWA, 11 February 1949

INDONESIA

I refer to despatch No. D.D. 87/48 [1], telegrams Nos. 343 [2],
347 [3] and 349 [4] from this Office and, especially, to your
telegram No. 17 [5] of 29th January to High Commissioner, London
(repeated to Ottawa as No. 29) together with our telegrams in
reply thereto, Nos. 42 [6] and 52 [7] -on the subject of the
Canadian reaction to Dutch aggression in Indonesia.

2. As explained in my last telegram (No. 52), I had brought before
both the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson the matters contained in
your telegram to London, No. 17, by hand-delivery letter, since it
was impossible to obtain an interview with either on the Saturday
morning on which your telegram arrived. This method was suggested
by Mr. Pearson himself on the telephone when he indicated that he
regretted being unable to see me at that moment but stated that he
would consider the contents of your telegram over the weekend and
would see me later. Both letters were forwarded on the same day as
the arrival of your telegram and both were acknowledged in writing
without comment.

3. I was not surprised that no comment was received, since the
press had already reported, before the arrival of your telegram
the fact that the United States resolution [8] had been passed,
substantially in its original form, by the Security Council and
the fact that Canada had supported the United States resolution.

4. In view, however, of your subsequent telegram No. 31 [9], I
sought a further interview with Mr. Pearson and was able to obtain
one after he had delivered his maiden speech in the House on the
subject of the North Atlantic Security Pact.

5. Mr. Pearson was not anxious to comment on the contents of the
Department's telegram to London since, as he stated, he presumed
that he had been given a copy for information only. In the course
of conversation, he stated that, if desired, he could give his
personal reactions on the contents. Emphasizing that he was
speaking personally only, he said that he felt sorry that it was
considered necessary to send the cable to London. In his own
words, he 'felt that British policy in respect of this very
difficult problem had been constructive and that Canada had found
itself in general agreement with the British approach to this
problem. Furthermore, Canada had worked with the United Kingdom,
the United States and others on the resolution before the Security
Council and he felt that the resolution, as finally adopted, while
it was American in its inception, had been discussed by the
Americans with other delegations (including the Canadians) and its
final form reflected the views of several members of the Council.

As the result of changes made in the resolution in the course of
these discussions, it became possible to obtain the necessary
agreement.'
6. Mr. Pearson added, 'Canada thinks that the resolution, as
eventually passed, was the most effective action that the Security
Council could have taken in all the circumstances of the case'.

7. Though the results of this interview were disappointing, I felt
that the reaction was, in some respects, inevitable since, by the
time the telegram to London arrived, Canada had committed itself
to a line of action in the Council and it was unlikely that Mr.

Pearson would be in a position to make any statement of a kind
other than that which he made to me.

8. The reasons behind the Canadian reaction on this matter will
have been made clear to you from my despatch mentioned above and
there is at the moment nothing which I can usefully add to that
report. The Australian point of view was clearly and firmly put to
the Canadian authorities in the earlier stages of the discussion
before the Security Council. As you will see from earlier
communications, it was received with courtesy but circumstances
existing before the Indonesian problem, in its latest form, arose,
made the Canadian reaction to it more or less inevitable. I cannot
too strongly emphasize that in the present stage of negotiations
directed towards the North Atlantic Security Pact, it is probable
that the Canadian Government will regard almost any other
international question as secondary to it. It appears that Dutch
timing of the 'police action' was largely determined by that
preoccupation of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada
herself.

9. I shall follow up the matter in view of the Security Council's
decision that certain action must be taken by 18th February and
will endeavour to find what the Canadian reaction on this aspect
will be.

10. I shall communicate on this later by telegram.