Departmental Dispatch 6/49 NEW DELHI, 3 February 1949

SECRET

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ASIAN CONFERENCE

You may find interest in the accompanying articles which appeared
in the 'Hindustan Times' of January 30th [1] and the 'National
Herald' of January 31st. [2] The Isaacs article probably owes
something to disclosures made by Romulo who we believe showed few
inhibitions where American journalists were concerned. Isaacs may
also be the victim of some of Romulo's impressions. The 'National
Herald' article fades towards the end.

2. In one important respect the Congress press differs from
official spokesmen in Delhi. It has always beaten the pistol by
imagining that an Asian bloc already exists except for the
accomplishment of a few formalities which it would probably
discount as merely formalities and in this mood it is apt to huff
and puff. Hence the references to Australian migration policy that
one finds in the present article and in others that appear,
editorially or otherwise from time to time.

3. In this period of flux no Asian country will take the risk of
keeping entirely aloof from any proposal for an Asian grouping
that comes forward from a responsible quarter but while an
impression of solidarity might thereby be created it by no means
follows that there is great cohesion in the present show of union.

Inside the Asian perimeter several possibilities of dispute are
capable in future of breaking through the surface. The position of
Indians in Burma and Ceylon, outstanding differences between India
and Pakistan, Siam's attitude towards Chinese migration and
Chinese minorities, the indeterminate nature of Indo-Chinese
relations are all cases in point. If the Arab countries are to be
included in Asia the likelihood of difficulties are multiplied.

4. In these circumstances the tendency may be for Asian bloc
protagonists to select targets like colonialism, neutrality and
racialism which will raise no dispute within Asia itself. The last
aspect provides one good reason why references in Australia to our
migration policy need to be most carefully handled, and mention of
colour as well as the use of the unhappy expression 'White
Australia' avoided religiously and at all costs. If policy has to
be explained then the defence of it need be not only expressed in
terms of Australian living standards and the deliberate
unproductiveness of Asian countries. With much wisdom it can also
be backed, where these invoke general principles, by the arguments
that Ceylon and Burma, for example, might be expected to use
against Indian pressure, or Siam against Chinese pressure where
the question of their own policies arise as they do arise and will
arise.

5. Whatever misgivings there are, there is equally much of a
constructive nature that regional organisation can accomplish in
Asia provided it is within the framework of the United Nations
Charter. Besides, there are Asian leaders, including Nehru, who
are prepared to see a grouping of Asian countries in its most
liberal sense. It is the pressure of zealots which needs to be
watched.

6. Some integration of Asian thought was inevitable. The idea of
cohesion having found its first expression over Indonesia, it was
just as inevitable that Australia should participate in the
discussions. To our mind Australian security is involved. It was
essential to prevent the conference holding itself out as purely
an Asian conference thereby favouring those who would build up an
Asian pressure group; it was essential to discourage an outlawing
of the Charter; it was essential to prevent any sudden alignment
of East versus West. There were incidental reasons such as the
factor of Communism in the region which as Nehru said could not be
permitted as the sole protagonist of Indonesian freedom.

7. Furthermore in the background of the Australian decision there
must be the disappearance of European, especially British
influence in South East Asia. This has left a political vacuum in
the area and represents a problem which, certainly in its early
phases, can be safely offset only by a stable combination of
Australia and India in association. The element of stability so
evident as the conference proceeded was due entirely to Australian
handling and the support given by Nehru and his advisers to this
approach.

8. Finally there was the aspect of India's membership of the
British Commonwealth, the prospects of which received a rude shock
on account of the United Kingdom attitude but subsequently
recovered as a result of Australian participation.

9. The Indian decision to request Australian participation derived
from various considerations. There was the obvious fact that for
some time India had closely consulted with Australia which country
held the initiative on the Indonesian question. Secondly and as
distinct from this the Indian Government, since August 15th, 1947,
has shown a tendency to look to Australian precedents, form and
experience in the development of its own agencies. This tendency
can also be discerned in broad policy subjects in which sphere
Australia's reputation for brisk and frank treatment of
international issues is recognised here.

10. Also behind the Indian decision was an admission of Australian
experience and Australian know-how in political questions. Indians
would be the first to admit that they themselves are relatively
without knowledge in the handling of current procedural issues,
certainly where as in the present instance they find themselves in
the position of having the initiative. Moreover while the sudden
calling of the conference owes much to Nehru's deep indignation
over the Dutch police action, his request that Australia should
participate in a full dress conference probably owes as much to
his advisers feeling that without Australian participation, the
conference, hastily called, might develop into an anti-climax.

11. Both before and during the conference the British remained
curiously aloof. Beforehand their High Commissioner kept away from
the Ministry of External Affairs and, although one might have at
least expected it, made no enquiry of us. Sir Archibald Nye
departed for Bombay just prior to the discussions, and his absence
from them was quite conspicuous, particularly since all other
diplomatic chiefs including the Dutch Ambassador [3] were in the
galleries at the two public sessions.

12. Of other missions outside the periphery of the conference the
Americans at first underestimated the proposal to hold it. Later
as the implications struck home their interest was very manifest.

Mr. Loy Henderson, their Ambassador, made it his business to
return from Calcutta and become a knowledgeable figure on the
fringe of the talks. The Canadians showed a prejudiced interest.

The French watched the conference intently and were no doubt
relieved when Indo-China like Palestine disappeared as a possible
item on the agenda.

13. The third annexure [4] to this despatch, a Reuters message
from London, describes the Russian attitude as being that any
strong regional grouping not under Russian influence is now
subject to suspicion in the Kremlin for being under the influence
of Britain and the United States. It has not been possible to
obtain any Russian reactions in Delhi itself.

14. We have suggested earlier that Australian participation was
inevitable also that the conference was kept on the rails largely
owing to the presence of Australian representatives and the
sobriety of Indian officials. As we see it critics must judge the
Australian contribution not by any set and preconceived notions
but rather by the several factors we have outlined and by the
attitude of the various groups here who saw the progress of the
conference at first hand. It can be accurately reported that the
British and American pressmen, including the B.B.C. correspondent
in Delhi spoke with approbation both about the manner of the
Australian approach and the effect of it. The Indians, both senior
officials and journalists, were genuinely impressed. Likewise the
American Ambassador whose gesture of approval in our presence to
Mr. Symon, deputy to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, could
not be mistaken when the conference concluded on January 23rd. The
Indonesians, who had expected so much knowing that they could not
achieve it, were gratified to all appearances. The Chinese
Ambassador this morning spoke in complimentary terms of the
Australian contribution. The Dutch Ambassador was relieved by the
result and privately expressed himself as being gratified by
references in a balanced analysis [5] made by Australia on the
opening day. These reactions point to one conclusion.

15. If one can treat the Indonesian question as having become only
one aspect of the Delhi conference then it can perhaps be regarded
as the second occasion on which Australia has been faced in an
adjoining region with a wholly intricate problem of statecraft
requiring at once a large measure of political acumen, a refusal
to be bogged down by traditional or negative attitudes, but at the
same time a perceptiveness which will discern the points at which
and the time at which other countries in the region will
capitalise on the issue. These qualities, as they can be estimated
here, have characterised the Australian approach to the Delhi
conference. What develops from it will require the closest
attention and it is in this context that the Indian aide memoire
referred to in our telegram No.94 [6] may prove relevant.

16. We are sending copy of this Despatch to the Australian High
Commissioner [7] in Ceylon and to the Official Secretary [8],
Office of the High Commissioner for Australia in Pakistan.