MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

ASIAN CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA

1. Your general instruction was that we should do everything
possible to ensure that the Asian Conference on Indonesia did not
take any action contrary to the purposes or to the procedures of
the Charter. We were not in a position to commit the Government to
any resolution. We also were instructed as to procedures so that
there would be no voting, no signing, and so that the final
conclusions would be agreed to ad referendum. Your object in this
was to give us freedom to play a full part in influencing the
outcome without risk of commitments, and at the same time enable
us to avoid the embarrassments, overseas and local, arising from a
clear-cut distinction between observer and delegate, and to act as
officials under instructions.

2. On arrival in Delhi it was immediately clear that the press
speculation on status, the demands that Australia should not
attend, the bitter comments by leaders of the Opposition regarding
Asiatics as being Communist inspired, etc., helped no little by
one-sided Reuter reports, had prejudiced greatly Australia's
position. We were received on trial and with the greatest reserve
by Indian officials and the Prime Minister. The first two days
were therefore spent making personal contact with members of the
Department of External Affairs, the Prime Minister's staff and
others. At the first informal meeting held at the Prime Minister's
home on the eve of the Conference, procedures were discussed. We
put forward our proposals, and, in the absence of any other clear
ideas, they were accepted. The picture was complicated by the fact
that the Arabs had come to the Conference to advocate a point of
view on Palestine and we therefore took advantage of this occasion
to make it clear that Indonesia was the only subject for
discussion. Though perhaps not relevant to the discussion our
general approach was indicated, that is, that this Conference
should act objectively and in accordance with the Charter. This,
added to the preliminary contacts made, helped to signify we were
taking a full part and suspicion was in part broken down.

3. The Conference commenced with the public session at which we
spoke only after having ascertained that all delegates were doing
so. This was well received and press reports of it coincided with
your statement [1] from Melbourne in support of the Conference.

4. Thus in the ensuing secret session we were fully accepted and,
in fact, after the first day we were looked to to give a lead. The
Prime Minister, Nehru, who chaired all meetings rarely moved ahead
without seeking our views and it followed we were placed on the
drafting committee along with Pakistan, India and Ceylon-four
Dominions. The Conference soon completed its business after this
point and final texts are attached. Your Sydney statement [2] was
reported at a most appropriate time and, being well received by
all delegates, greatly assisted us in pressing the case for the
United Nations.

5. The following observations are relevant:-

(a) India Relations
We learnt from the United Kingdom High Commissioner that Nehru had
told him that the United Kingdom attitude over Indonesia was not
helpful to his endeavours to bring India within the Commonwealth.

Senior officers of the Department of External Affairs confirmed
this and clearly implied that had Australia not attended the
Conference, or had Australia attended only in the suspect position
of observers, the consequences may have been serious. India is
disturbed and bewildered over United Kingdom foreign policy,
especially South-East Asia policy, but sees hope in British
Commonwealth co-operation if Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Ceylon and herself can influence British Commonwealth policy.

(b) Burma Relations
A similar position exists in Burma. Apparently you influenced
greatly their present Foreign Minister [3] while at Paris. He
explained that he cannot see his way clear to join the British
Commonwealth, but as a first step is eager to join the five
Dominions in this area in regional consultations. This perhaps
should be followed up and consideration might be given to the
establishment of a Consulate at Rangoon and the supply of
constitutional, technical and other advice they are at present
seeking from us.

(c) Communism
One striking feature of the Conference was that every government
represented, and that includes every government in the area, was
without exception anti-Communist and free reference was made to
the need of action on Indonesia and like cases to offset the
infiltration of subversive influence. In fact, Nehru explained to
Bevin one reason why the United Kingdom and the United States of
America were not invited was that he did not wish to ruin the
Conference by inviting Russia. The clear fact is (and MacDonald at
Singapore agrees with this) that the only Communist dangers in
Asia occur in the territories which have not yet self-government-
French Indo-China, Malaya, and until Hatta took his action, in
Indonesia. This fully justifies Australia's policy of assisting
true nationalist movements. United Kingdom policy so far does not
seem to take account of this fact as evidenced by the United
Kingdom Government attitude not only in relation to Indonesia, but
also to French Indo-China, which incidentally will at any time
attract the attention of the nations represented at this
Conference. Recent discussions between Britain, France and the
United States on how to combat communism in South East Asia again
point to the fact that they do not realise the value and
significance of this regional group and tend to use the anti-
Communist line to justify action such as France has taken in
French Indo-China.

(d) Regionalism
There is a strong desire on the part of all independent States for
continuous regional consultation and organisation. Because of
experiences at ECAFE and because of the nature of international
conferences which include the Great Powers, there is a marked
reluctance to include in a regional organisation, either colonial
or other powers not actually located in the area. The United
States Ambassador at Delhi considers it would be most unwise for
the Great Powers to be included. Nehru wishes to press on with a
regional organisation, and we reminded the Conference of your
statement [4] made in the House in February, 1947, advocating
regionalism, particularly in the economic field.

(e) Economic Relations
There is a strong feeling expressed by the Prime Minister and also
by the Governor of Calcutta [5], amongst others, that Australia
should use her resources more to the advantage of the area in
which she lives. They feel our preference to the United Kingdom
shown in bulk purchases (and incidentally shown in the higher
price for wheat sold to India than to the United Kingdom based on
transport costs from a point outside Australia) is hardly in
accord with our long-term market interests and in their view,
certainly not in accord with our own future regional interests.

6. The Asian Conference on Indonesia was even more important than
the question of Indonesia. It has shown that we can work with this
group and that they are willing and anxious to work with us and in
accord with the Charter. It was most noticeable that at no stage
during this Conference were any questions of national prestige or
political ideology interfering with the discussion based on facts
and careful reasoning. It seems, however, that if we are to
influence this group of nations, we should on such occasions be
represented at a Ministerial level and treat their deliberations
no less seriously than we would the deliberations of any other
international conference. On this basis Australia can rely on the
help and understanding of Nehru, with whom we finally established
quite unreserved and friendly relations and who showed himself
determined to maintain the peaceful conditions in Asia and to
avoid racial arguments or disputes.

7. We hope the Government will find that the final resolutions [6]
are wholly in accord with Australian foreign policy and will be
able to communicate to the Prime Minister, Nehru, the endorsement
of the first resolution which follows the United States draft [7]
before the Security Council, but which adds to it proposals on the
fundamental issues of the future use of the police force and the
steps to be taken towards self-government, which the United States
Government, under threat of veto by the French, was reluctant to
introduce. We hope, too, that the Government can give their
agreement to taking early action on the other two resolutions,
particularly that one dealing with regional consultation, as it is
important that the initiative should rest with Australia, or
jointly with Australia and India, in order to avoid any suggestion
of a regional organisation based on considerations of race.