Historical documents
Working Paper NEW DELHI, 20 January 1949
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFERENCE ON INDONESIA
WORKING PAPER
(For meeting at 6.30 p.m. on January 20, 1949.)
Proposals for a Settlement of the Indonesian question, covering
(1) measures to be taken immediately, and
(2) measures to be taken thereafter so as to effect a long term
settlement.
Under head (1) the following steps are immediately necessary and
have already been recommended by the Security Council in its
Resolutions of December 24 and December 28 [1], 1948, though those
Resolutions have not yet been implemented by the Dutch:
(i) the cessation of hostilities:
(ii) the release of all the Republican leaders now in detention
and the restoration to them of full freedom of action. (So far, of
the principal Republican leaders only Dr. Sjahrir is known to have
been released.)
Even if these conditions are fulfilled the Republican Government
cannot function effectively so long as Dutch troops remain in
Republican territory. Proposals that the Dutch be called upon to
withdraw their forces immediately failed of adoption in the
Security Council. It is necessary now to ensure:
(iii) the withdrawal of Dutch troops from territory occupied by
them since December 18, 1948.
It is understood that certain members of the Security Council have
been considering a draft Resolution [2] which declares that the
continued occupation of Republican territory by Dutch forces is
incompatible with a just settlement of the dispute; but which
contemplates only a progressive restoration of the Republican
Government's administration in the territory formerly controlled
by it. It appears that this restoration is to take place only
after the formation of an Interim Government and that a Commission
of the Security Council is to decide what areas are to be restored
to Republican administration consistently with the interests of
public security and what Dutch forces, if any, are to be retained
temporarily in any area for the maintenance of law and order.
The Indonesians attach the highest importance to the withdrawal of
the Dutch forces from Republican territory, and Dr. Hatta is
reported to have informed the Committee of Good Offices which
recently interviewed him that the Republic's authority must be
fully restored before any further step could be taken.
A further immediate measure desired by Republican representatives
who have stated their views in Delhi is
(iv) the restoration of freedom of commerce and movement to and
from Republican territory, which had been impeded by the Dutch
blockade even during the period of negotiations.
Finally, to achieve a lasting settlement, it is necessary that
(v) the parties should resume discussions for an overall political
settlement under the auspices of a Committee or Commission of Good
Offices appointed by the Security Council.
Under head (2), the first step necessary is,
(i) the formation of an Interim Government of the United States of
Indonesia. It is desirable that this should be effected at an
early date, and March 15, 1949 was mentioned in the draft Security
Council Resolution. The Indonesian Republicans would favour an
earlier date, say March 1.
Under the Renville Agreement [3], the Provisional Federal
Government was to be adequately representative of the various
federating States including the Republic; and so far as the
Republic was concerned its extent was to be finally determined by
a plebiscite in the Islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura. Later
discussions have proceeded on the assumption that the formation of
a Provisional Federal Government need not be delayed pending the
final delineation of the individual federating States.
Consideration will have to be given to the composition and powers
of the Interim Government. The Dutch have promulgated a Decree
(known as the B.I.O. Decree [4]) to cover these interim
arrangements. This Decree provides for only a limited exercise of
power by the Interim Government. The draft resolution referred to
contemplates the grant of powers of internal government to the
Interim Government. This would seem to deprive the Interim
Government of direct representation in foreign countries although
the Republic, which has been accorded de facto recognition by
several Governments, maintains Representatives in certain
countries.
During the negotiations immediately preceding the latest Dutch
military action, Republican leaders suggested that the Interim
Government should consist of a Council of Ministers of Indonesian
nationality to be chosen by agreement between the Representative
of the Dutch Crown and representatives of the Republic on the one
hand and of the 'Federalists' (Non-Republican Indonesian Groups)
on the other. They also laid down the following conditions:-
(a) that the Interim Government should have a national character
and should be vested with concrete powers;
(b) that the Ministers should be persons with an adequate sense of
responsibility and should be known throughout Indonesia;
(c) that the Interim Government should function democratically and
promote the development of democracy among the peoples;
(d) that the Interim Government should eventually be responsible
to a Constituent Assembly.
It should be noted here that the negotiations broke down on the
refusal of the Dutch to agree that the Indonesian armed forces (as
distinct from Dutch forces) should be under the control of the
Interim Government and that Dutch forces could be employed for the
preservation of internal security in Indonesia only with the
consent of the Interim Government.
The next point under this head is
(ii) the holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly, which
will determine the future Constitution of the United States of
Indonesia. It is necessary to suggest a date by which the
elections should be completed and October 1, 1949, is proposed.
This will give a period of just over six months from the date of
formation of the Interim Government for the necessary arrangements
to be made. The Renville proposals, and constitutional plans
prepared later, contemplated a similar period of preparation. The
Indonesian representatives here suggest that the elections should
be completed by June 1.
It is necessary that the elections should be free and fair, and to
ensure this they should be observed and supervised by the Security
Council's Commission in Indonesia. Freedom of elections cannot be
achieved if Dutch troops are allowed to remain in Republican
territory during the preparatory period.
Finally, it is necessary
(iii) to fix a date for the transfer of power to the United States
of Indonesia. January 1, 1950, is suggested. Under the Linggadjati
Agreement [5] the United States of Indonesia should have come into
being on January 1, 1949, but the Dutch have announced that the
present situation prevented fulfilment of this programme. It is
understood that one proposal under informal discussion among
members of the Security Council contemplates the transfer of power
by April 1, 1950. A period of nine months from the formation of
the Interim Government should, however, suffice, particularly as
under (ii) above it is contemplated that elections should be
completed in about six months' time. A similar period of nine
months was contemplated in the Cochran Plan. [6] The Indonesians
have recommended that the transfer of sovereignty should take
place on September 1, 1949, and that by that date all Dutch troops
should withdraw from the whole of Indonesia.
[AA : A1838, 383/1/25]