130 Joint Intelligence Committee Appreciation 5/1949
Extracts  MELBOURNE, 15 July 1949 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM IN CHINA AND ITS
EFFECT ON SOUTH EAST ASIA
As requested by minute dated 16th May, 1949, we have prepared for
the information of the Joint Planning Committee an Appreciation
on the above subject.
2. To determine the most likely employment of Sino-Soviet forces
in south-east Asia in the event of war.
3. The whole of China is under Communist control.
4. The U.S.S.R. is the only major power with whom the Western
become involved in war in the foreseeable future.
5. The aim of the U.S.S.R., unlike that of Germany and Japan in
the late war, does not necessarily envisage territorial or
economic gains as final objectives, but as stepping stones for the
promotion of world communism.
6. The U.S.S.R. will not resort to military action as long as her
aims continue to be accomplished by the exploitation of indigenous
communist parties, minorities, disaffected elements, and the
manipulation of international organisations.
7. The Soviet's general war plan will be to fight a full scale
aggressive war on her western and southern fronts with the object
of overrunning Europe-including Great Britain-and the Middle East.
In the Far East, she win ensure the security of her Eastern and
South Eastern frontiers using only the forces which can be made
available without prejudice to her operations in the main
8. In war, Communist China will be an active ally of the U.S.S.R.
9. Chinese nationalism, while allied to the over-riding communist
aim, also seeks to extend the sphere of influence of China
throughout South East Asia.
10. In South East Asia, indigenous communist parties, certain
schismatic nationalist movements, and the Chinese minorities
overseas, will lend support to, and receive assistance from, the
11. The strengths of Communist forces, which are at present
disposed in the Far East, will be those available for operations
in this theatre.
[matter omitted] 
SINO-SOVIET GRAND STRATEGY IN THE FAR EAST
59. Primarily the Soviet's Far Eastern objective will be to ensure
the security of her eastern and south-eastern frontiers. The
Soviet leaders will consider that with the forces available to
them this can best be achieved by [an offensive]  against Japan
and the Ryukyus.
60. The requirements of her primary objective satisfied, any
forces not required
for it, will become available for operations in South East Asia.
61. The Chinese primary objective will be the spreading of
communism to, and
the increase of Chinese influence through, South East Asia. The
Chinese leaders will consider that with the forces available to
them this can best be achieved by an offensive southward from the
southern Chinese border. This will fit in with Russian ideas.
[matter omitted] 
74. The object of the Chinese land forces will be to overrun the
mainland of South East Asia with a view to:
(a) setting up puppet governments sympathetic to Chinese
(b) disrupting the economy of South East Asia and cutting off rice
supplies to India and other non rice areas.
(c) denying the bases and resources of South East Asia to the
(d) tying down Western forces.
[matter omitted]