Indonesia. I have tried to keep you fully informed both as to
Council proceedings and background as Indonesian case has been
dealt with over past couple of weeks and there is little which can
now be added in the way of general comment.

2. The outstanding fact is not specially related to Indonesia and
lies in the disturbing deterioration of the Council as an
effective instrument at all. The clear lesson is that it is little
more than yet another sounding board for Great Power disagreement,
and the protection it can afford any small power against
aggression is small. The calibre of representatives is much lower
than before, with consequential effects on the exercise of
discretion in debate.

3. It was reasonable to hope last week that, with the USSR, US,
and UK all favouring withdrawal, the only action likely to save
the Republic would be taken. I have described to you the tragic
inability of the Great Powers to reach a formula on which they
could agree. This week, with a hardening in the UK attitude
against the Republic which leads one to the belief that this is
what they really felt all along, and with the US not wishing at
any cost to side with Russia against Western Union, any hopes that
might have been entertained soon faded. The Russian attitude
towards the GOC, and her determination to make political capital
at any cost, was a contributory factor of at least equal force.

When the negative, even irresponsible, attitudes of Argentina and
Canada are also taken into account the lack of results is
understandable. The French and Belgian positions had at least the
merit of consistency, and the other members of the Council were
fair and objective throughout.

4. I find it hard to see what more Australia could have done. I
know you were working hard through diplomatic channels, and here I
spared no effort to impress our views on all members of the
Council (and on those non-members participating) continuously. We
intervened in the debates as often as possible, consistent with
the somewhat anomalous and powerless position of a non-member. We
were in close touch with Palar and Desai (India) as to tactics
throughout. So far as the US is concerned, it is not going too far
to say that we were directly responsible for the strength of their
initial approach. It is disappointing to record, this week at
least, a coldly uncooperative attitude on the part of the UK. I
attribute most blame to weakness and vacillation of UK and US who
steadily retreated from the reasonably firm initial stand.

5. The Dutch clearly do not understand the nature of the
resistance they will encounter, or what is likely to happen in the
long run-the triumph of extremist forces in Indonesia with
attendant dangers to all white races in the area. To suggest, as
Jessup did yesterday, that the work of the Council had enabled the
people of Indonesia to look to the future with hope is, in my
view, playing with words. It seems, apart from uncoordinated
guerrilla action, that we are faced with a military fait accompli
in Indonesia. Netherlands calculated correctly on the weakness and
divisions in Security Council and throughout was determined to
defy Council opinion and resolutions.

6. Question now is what can be done in New York. Suggest something
along following lines. GOC should present report with programme
for creation of a representative United States of Indonesia and a
recommendation as to action SC might take. All their reports since
December 18 have been good and their findings clearly establish
Netherlands violations. Replace or merge GOC in wider body on spot
with increased functions and powers, as constant tendency in
Council to challenge any action GOC does other than bringing
parties together.

7. It is essential to preserve as much of integrity of Republic as
possible in United States of Indonesia. Wider body could mediate
and assist in negotiations to ensure fair play, bring about early
elections, and to prevent reprisals and executions. While Council
was loath to take firm action on immediate problem it was clear
that feeling against Netherlands was hardening and in United
States the Council might well be persuaded to take strong action
in solution long-term problem.

8. To this end, diplomatic representations could be made at
Washington, London and especially Ottawa. Idea is to obtain
assurance that US and UK will give definite lead and for US to
enlist support of Cuba and Argentina and for UK support of France
and Norway.

9. I am inclined to think idea any form of Trusteeship
impracticable and in any case would involve long consultations and
consequent delay.