Departmental Dispatch Hag 67/48 THE HAGUE, 22 December 1948

SECRET

INDONESIA

The first reactions to the police action undertaken by the
Netherlands Government in Indonesia are somewhat mingled. While
there is general gratification at the rapid successes won by the
Dutch forces and the capture of the majority of the Republican
Government, there is some uneasiness at the almost uniformly
unfavourable repercussions abroad. In particular, sharp attacks on
the Netherlands in the Security Council are expected. The
Netherlands delegate's statement in Paris that the Council is not
competent to deal with the Indonesian question [1] is featured in
the Press but despite the widespread contention here that the
police action is a 'domestic affair' and that foreign interference
will not be tolerated, the probable long term consequences for the
Netherlands of a step which had been talked about for so long that
it had become almost an abstraction, are slowly beginning to be
realised.

2. The fact that the action was begun at a weekend has delayed
pronouncements by trade unions and other bodies, which needed to
call meetings of their executives before being able to state their
policies. However, as early as Sunday 19th December, the Executive
Committee of the Trade Union Federation (N.V.V.) had appealed to
the Dutch workers to continue at their jobs and take no ill-
considered action. The Chairman of the Catholic Labour Union
(K.A.B.) announced that the task of the Labour Union was purely
social and there was no reason for it to interfere with the
decisions of the Government in the Indonesian question. The
(Protestant) Christian National Labour Movement (C.N.V.) made a
similar pronouncement. The Communist party published a
proclamation in its organ DE WAARHEID attacking the Government and
calling upon all workers, including members of the P.v.d.A.

(Labour Party), to refuse co-operation with the Government. The
proclamation alleges that the members of this latter party, to
which the Prime Minister belongs, had been betrayed by the party
executive, which had met in secret to approve the military action.

'Without the co-operation of your party' the declaration
continues, 'this new violation of right and democracy would not
have been possible. You must now show your true colours. A
socialist and a democrat can never tolerate the use of force
against the fraternal people of Indonesia... If you mean to be a
Red, then you must show it now by openly resisting the Drees-Beel
policy ... Not one more cent or one more man for the Government's
policy.'
3. With the attack on the Netherlands Government, the Communist
paper linked an equally strong criticism of the Republican
Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Republican armed
forces, whom it described as traitors who had deserted to the
Dutch and were enjoying 'princely' internment at their hands. It
further suggested that this so-called 'Hatta Group' did not
attempt more than the token defence of Djokja and preferred to
await the arrival of Dutch parachutists and comfortable
imprisonment to fighting. It also described what was said to be
Hatta's last act before his capture, namely the signing of an
Order of the Day in which Administrative officials in Sumatra were
urged to remain at their posts and in which administrative
authority was delegated to local defence councils, as one of
treachery. 'Apparently' according to DE WAARHEID, 'the aim was to
prevent the setting up of any central direction for the defence of
Sumatra'. The somewhat tortuous reasoning of this last suggestion
may perhaps be explained by references appearing in the
Proclamation already cited, to the 'opening of the doors of the
Republic to colonial troops by types like Hatta' who had by
'cowardly murder' deprived the Republic of its best defenders-the
Communists.

4. In the debate in the Second Chamber which followed the
statement by the Netherlands Prime Minister on the Indonesian
situation on 20th December, the Communist motion calling upon the
Government to give an immediate order to Dutch troops to cease
fire, was defeated by 80 votes to 8. All parties except the
Communists supported the Government. Although supporting the
Government in the vote, Jhr. van der Goes van Naters of the
socialist section of the Party of Labour, raised the question of
whether the last letter to Hatta [2] had not been 'unfortunate'
and 'too stiff' and whether the time limit allowed the Republic
had not been too short. In the course of his speech he strongly
criticised Professor Romme of the K.V.P. (Right Wing Catholic
Party) for an article he had written for the VOLKSKRANT attacking
the proponents of arbitration. He declared that some members of
his party had strong objections to the course adopted which in
their opinion would not put an end to extremism but would drive
the extremists into the Communist camp and strengthen the position
of Communism in South East Asia and in particular in Indonesia.

Van der Goes concluded by saying that his party would await
developments and remain 'constructively critical'.

5. In a statement after the debate, the Minister for Overseas
Territories, Mr Sassen, in expressing the Government's
appreciation of the confidence shown in it, declared that the
action had been taken only after it had become clear that
consultation was no longer possible. With reference to the
question whether the last letter which had been handed to the
Republican Government through the United States member of the Good
Offices Committee, Mr Merle Cochran, had not been 'very stiff', Mr
Sassen stated that the intention had been to make clear the
seriousness of the situation and in the opinion of the Government
it had been useful and necessary to draft the letter as had been
done. The Minister rejected the possibility of arbitration and
stated that the same difficulties would be involved in mediation
as had been involved in observance of the truce.

6. In the course of his statement Mr Sassen said that he had
before him a decree of the Republican Minister of Defence relating
to resistance, revolt, intimidation, sabotage and rebellion in
Java. It will be recalled that the Prime Minister's statement to
Parliament was built around the alleged preparations of the
Indonesian Republican Army for a large-scale offensive early in
January, which it was claimed, justified the launching of the
Dutch action. In this connection, a pamphlet issued by the
Netherlands Information Service at the same time as the first
communique regarding the police action was furnished to the press,
purports to give documentary evidence regarding alleged Republican
orders for mass infiltrations and the commencement of a Bersiap
[3] period of terrorism. An examination of this document, copy of
which is annexed (Annexure A [4]) shows it to be somewhat clumsily
drafted. Moreover the principal support for the Dutch Intelligence
report regarding the proposed action by the Indonesians appears to
be an alleged confession by a captured Japanese quoted on page 16
of the pamphlet. The document is dated 15th December, suggesting
that propaganda preparations for the police action had been set in
train well in advance. It seems, however, to be fairly well
established that the final decision was not taken by Cabinet until
the morning of Saturday, 18th December.

7. The first suggestions of difficulties being encountered by the
Netherlands forces appeared in the semi-official A.N.P.-ANETA
bulletin of 22nd December, in which an official military spokesman
in The Hague was quoted as saying that the main military action
would not take very long but that it would take from four to six
months to clean up the extremists gangs 'who would probably become
guerrillas'. Indonesian Republican claims that renewed fighting
had broken out in and around Djokja are also quoted in the same
bulletin with the sole comment that no reports confirming these
claims had been received in The Hague.