Cablegram 500 NEW DELHI, 21 December 1948, 6.25 p.m.
IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET
Your telegram 332. [1] Following a discussion this morning with
K.P.S. Menon, we are awaiting the Government of India's comment to
the Australian proposals.
2. Menon showed me a strong telegram which Nehru has sent to his
High Commissioner in London. This repeats the attitude already
outlined in my telegram 494 [2] but goes much further, stating it
to be the Government of India's intention to break off diplomatic
relations with Holland which Nehru's message says specifically
involves the recall of the Indian Consul-General from Batavia and
the handing to the Dutch Ambassador here (Lamping) of his
passports. He asked Menon whether this intention is being made
public. He replied that Attlee's reaction is first awaited. He
then asked me whether I thought Lamping should be told of what
Nehru intends, although he was quite possibly thinking aloud. I
avoided comment. He told me in confidence that the Government of
India are thinking of putting an embargo on operations of K.L.M.
in and through India.
3. Menon seemed rather pleased about the American attitude
(although Nehru's telegram to Krishna Menon took the line that it
is Anglo-American help to Holland under the Marshall Plan and
Western interference which has made the Dutch action in Indonesia
possible). He said that he had heard a report that, following the
Dutch attack, the State Department delivered to the Dutch
Ambassador in Washington a note so stiff in its terms that the
latter sought to have its strong language modified. He also
referred [to] the proposed United States resolution to the
Security Council [3], which seems somewhat narrower than the
Australian approach.
4. I was a little early for the interview. While I was waiting for
him to finish with his Private Secretary, he dictated two
messages, one to Batavia and one to London which neither appeared
to attempt to cloak. The message to London, after stating it to be
the Government of India's understanding that Belgium and France
propose to adopt a neutral attitude in the Security Council,
expresses the hope that whatever line these countries adopt
Britain will come out in favour of the Indonesian position. [4]
[AA:A1838, TS383/6/1, i]