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Historical documents

416 Department of External Affairs to Hodgson

Cablegram P282 CANBERRA, 21 December 1948, 10.15 p.m.

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Indonesia
Following is an amplification of our previous telegrams. [1]

1. Dutch action represents failure to abide by previous decisions
of the Council concerning cease-fire and settlement of the dispute
by peaceful means and disregard for reasonable settlement terms
offered by the Cochran proposals. [2] It might add weight to
subsequent measures to be taken against the Dutch and afford
support to Governments if they want to give future assistance to
the Republicans as a de facto government, if the Security Council
determined the action to be an 'act of aggression' within the
meaning of Article 39. [3] On the other hand we would not wish
quick action by the Security Council to be held up by procedural
arguments on point and it may be better to assume this is the
case.

2. The Council should first endeavour by implementation of steps
in paragraphs
3(1), 3(2) and 3(3) of our P.273 [4] to restore the situation as a
provisional measure under
Article 40 [5] to the position before Dutch recourse to unlawful
action. You comment in your 272 [6] that United States draft is
very strong and direct but in our view it is the bare minimum that
is justified. We have 3 further comments-
(a) there is no specific provision for observation of enforcement
of the truce and withdrawal and this should be included;

(b) we cannot see point of asking the Committee of Good Offices
for assessment of the blame when their present report [7] is
perfectly clear;

(c) in the light of this report and of the facts we do not think
the Council should call on both parties as stated in the
resolution. The Dutch broke the truce. In fact there is no
evidence that Republicans have gone beyond the demarcation line
and therefore if they have not broken truce they should not be
asked to lay down arms.

3. The object of the Council should be to ensure after the
restoration of the status quo the acceptance and implementation of
the main points in the proposals submitted by Cochran and
substantially accepted by the parties (points 3(4), 3(5) in our
telegram). The Council may recommend terms of settlement under
Article 37 [8] but we are assuming that in this case it will under
Articles 39 and 41 decide the terms of settlement, at least on the
major outstanding issues.

4. As a supplement to the election of the Republican Assembly
proposed by Cochran it seems to us that the Dutch should also be
required under Article 40 to refrain from further action to
appoint representatives to their Federal Interim Government since
further unilateral action in this direction will aggravate the
situation, as predicted by the Committee of Good Offices in their
report on the breakdown on direct negotiations and would not be
consistent with the Cochran terms of settlement. [9] 5. A United
Nations Standing Body would be required to supervise the cessation
of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops, and the elections. The
functions of such a body, which might necessitate the
reconstitution of the Committee of Good Offices under another name
should extend to:-

(a) powers of truce supervision including the right to establish
demilitarised zones.

(b) observation of conditions preparatory to the conduct of
elections and recommendation of the appropriate date for election
in the light of conditions, early elections being the aim.

(c) continuing the mediation powers with the right to make
proposals to either party.

A new body could include those present members of the Committee of
Good Offices willing to continue to serve.

6. Our reference to trusteeship which would have to be negotiated
in consultation with the Republic was offered as an alternative to
an imposed settlement on the above lines. Its purpose would be to
offer the Republic security from future attack. The United Nations
Administering Body would have to be largely independent of the
Security Council, along the lines of the Palestine Commission or
else subordinate to the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly.

We would want to give this idea further thought.

7. Assuming the Dutch ignore the cease fire and withdrawal order
the Council should nevertheless go on record with an adequate
basis of settlement of the kind outlined above.

1 Documents 391, 396 and 414.

2 See Documents 237 and 238.

3 Article 39 of the United Nations Charter empowers the Security
Council to 'determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression' and to 'make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to
maintain or restore international peace and security'.

4 Document 396.

5 Under article 40 of the UN Charter the Security Council may call
upon the parties to a dispute to comply with such provisional
measures as it considers desirable before making recommendations
to settle the dispute in accordance with Article 39.

6 Document 407.

7 See Document 392.

8 Under Article 37 of the United Nations Charter, the Security
Council may recommend procedures to settle a dispute which it
considers likely to endanger international peace and security.

9 In its report to the Security Council dated 12 December (see
Document 366), the Committee of Good Offices argued that 'the
formation of an interim federal government now without the
Republic will greatly complicate a negotiated settlement of the
Indonesian dispute and could create serious unrest in Indonesia'.


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Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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