Your 1290. [2]

Conversation you refer to took place ten days before present
police action and at a time when advices were being received
through you that State Department did not consider risk of police
action as being serious. Conversation was in relation to Lapstone
vote and in an endeavour to persuade Cowen not to take what we
regarded as a disastrous step, that is voting with the Dutch.

While Lovett might resent my comments, it is a great pity that our
advice that the Lapstone vote would be interpreted as a green
light to the Dutch was not heeded. As you know, back in October we
sent through Cowen a long statement of our views [3] and fears on
Indonesia seeking United States comment. We received none and you
recently reported that they assumed no comment was necessary as
Critchley was in contact with Cochran. The fact is we have been
giving persistent warnings and urging United States pressure, but
it is only recently that any pressure has been exerted and, even
then, not in any determinate way.

2. You might explain to Lovett the context of my conversation with
Cowen. At the same time, you might assure him, in answer to your
paragraph 4 of 1288 [4], that we have no intention at Paris of
suggesting United States responsibility but wish to co-operate
very closely with United States in the strong belief that the
fundamental European conflict can be won or lost in this area
without far closer co-operation and consultation between U.S.A.

and Australia than has been the case up to date.

3. As Lovett will know, I am seeing Poster daily in Cowen's
absence and he will no doubt report our desire to co-operate
closely with the United States, our pleasure at the United States'
prompt action and invitation to us to be associated with it, but,
at the same time, our concern that not only in relation to
Indonesia but South-East Asia matters generally there is not a far
greater exchange of information than has been up to the present.