My 1289. Before replying to my questions, Lovett read report from
Cowen to effect that in interview with him you had stated:

(a) That United States could have prevented Dutch Military action
if they had so desired.

(b) That United States should not have been surprised at Dutch
action.

(c) That you could not understand why United States had not used
ERP aid as a lever, and
(d) That any disadvantages in restraining member of Western Union
would be more than offset by advantage in settling Indonesian
question.

2. Lovett said that, while United States and Australian views
largely coincided, he could not accept and must dissociate himself
from statements such as you had made, which appeared to be based
on bad advice or lack of information. He pointed out that the
United States had sent a blunt note [2] to the Dutch about ten
days ago warning of action United States would take if Dutch
proceeded with their plans. (See our telegram 1253 [3] para. 2).

Cochran had taken every step possible up till eleventh hour, e.g.:

He had flown to DJOKJAKARTA and had secured letter from Hatta [4]
while Australian representative was absent in Canberra or
somewhere. [5]

3. I did not, of course, make any comment on Lovett's remarks,
particularly as I had not been advised of your interview with
Cowen. [6] I feel, however, you should know that Lovett appeared
strongly to resent your statements as Cowen has reported them. It
might be helpful if you could at some stage express appreciation
for such steps as United States have taken, or if you could
authorize me to do so.