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Historical documents

39 Critchley to Kirby [1]

Memorandum BATAVIA, 3 February 1948

[matter omitted]

There is little doubt that the Dutch are extremely anxious to
continue their policy of breaking the country up into small units
which will be dependent on them, and there is already considerable
evidence that they will not be too particular about the 'Renville'
agreement in carrying the policy into effect. In West Java, for
example, they are determined to go ahead with the third
conference, which will set up a new negara. [2] Hatta assures me
that all sorts of undemocratic procedures are taking place, such
as direct military intimidation in the villages, and has promised
to supply details. You will remember that the second West Java
conference was called by the Recomba -the administrative officer
directly responsible to van Mook. Invitations to attend were sent
out in the name of representatives of the N.E.I. Government and
these representatives were selected by a Contact Committee which
had been formed by an earlier conference called by the Recomba in
the same way. Since the first conference agreed it was not
completely representative of the people, the Contact Committee
which chose the second conference was clearly undemocratic.

[matter omitted]

Interim Report:

The first complete draft of the interim Report [3] is even more
unsatisfactory than I anticipated in Singapore. It reflects the
views of the United States and Belgian delegations, and even where
Australia explicitly disagreed this is not always noted in the
text. Moore informs me that there is evidence that the other
delegations, and particularly the United States delegation, fear a
separate report from Australia. This fear could be a powerful
pressure, which would be the more effective if a strong statement
along the lines outlined to you in Singapore were proposed by you
in the first instance on the subject of the Madura report or the
Rawahgedeh report and the Sjarifuddin memorandum of December 21st,
1947. [4]

[matter omitted]

New Republican Cabinet:

The new right wing cabinet announced on Saturday consists of 15
ministers, of which 10 belong to political parties. It represents
a victory for the Masjoemi, which are strongest with 4 seats, and
the PNI 3 seats, over the Socialist Party and other left wing
elements. None of the left wing (Sajap Kiri) is included. Hatta
offered 3 seats to left wing figures, Sjarifuddin, Abdoelmadjid
and Tjokronegoro, but the left wing rejected the offer and
protested strongly against key positions being held by the
Masjoemi and PNI. Sjarifuddin has also resigned as chairman of the
delegation. I understand from Hatta he was personally agreeable to
co-operating, but his party forced him to refuse. His place as
chairman will be taken by Roem (Masjoemi), who is not nearly as
capable. Replacements in the delegation will be made from the
advisers.

[matter omitted]

ADDENDUM

The bag closes in half an hour and I shall include this rough
outline of the most recent developments.

Truce:

Elliott has returned to Batavia to report personally on the
implementation of the Truce in Sumatra. His three main points
were:

(i) the Truce is working out reasonably satisfactorily;

(ii) Republicans have a hard pill to swallow insofar as the Van
Mook line permits the advance of Netherlands troops into rich
industrial areas in which they have not been since before the war.

Moreover, the Van Mook line is defined so as to include both banks
of a river constituting a demarkation line. Elliott, obtained
agreement from the Dutch that the Republic could use the river for
communication although the Dutch have insisted on the right of
search.

(iii) In general, Elliott's impressions were that the Republic was
doing their best to carry out the Truce fully and effectively, but
he was not sure but that the Dutch would like it to fail.

The Republic has reported a major incident, and have listed about
300 Indonesian casualties in 30 alleged incidents with the Dutch
since the signing of the Truce on Jan 17th. The principal incident
took place on Jan 26th at two villages about 20 miles south east
of Cheribon. It is alleged that Dutch soldiers machine-gunned and
bayoneted 285 people, mortared the villages and burned about 138
houses.

The Truce committee has referred the reported incidents to the
other party for comment. In committee, we shall endeavour to have
the more important Republican reports investigated so that they
can be given a full airing. This means of course that we would
also investigate a corresponding number of Dutch claims. At
present this policy is handicapped by a lack of Military
Assistants.

There has been a last minute hitch over the employment of
additional Military Assistants. When the committee decided nearly
a fortnight ago that about 60 were required, this information was
discussed informally with Van Vredenburch and General Spoor. Full
details were given without any objections being raised. It was
only a couple of days ago, however, that the Consular Commission
advised the committee that additional Military Assistants would be
made available and we then informed the Netherlands formally and
in writing of our proposals.

Immediately afterwards we received word of the impending departure
of 14 Military Assistants from Canberra but the Dutch have asked
us to delay their departure. Although the Consulate and the
Committee have written strong letters the last two days have been
unavailing in obtaining a decision from the Netherlands that the
Australian Military Assistants can be used. This is a clear
example of [Dutch obstruction]. [5]

1 Kirby arrived in Singapore on 27 January and was joined the next
day by Critchley who wrote him a memorandum (not located) on the
situation in the NEI. Kirby left Singapore by air on 29 January
for Batavia and from there, with Graham, for Amsterdam. There
Kirby and Graham Joined Van Zeeland and held discussions on 31
January with members of the Netherlands Government. All three
Committee members flew from Amsterdam to New York on 31 January
arriving the following day. Critchley's memorandum was dispatched
on 5 February by air mail via Singapore to Kirby in New York.

2 Following their military occupation of most of West Java, the
Netherlands attempted to set up a Sundanese regime there amenable
to Netherlands control. The Dutch Recomba convened the First West
Java Conference between 12 and 19 October 1947 and the Second West
Java Conference between 15 and 20 December 1947 (see Volume XI,
Documents 477, 479 and 484).

3 i.e. the draft of the Interim Report of the Committee of Good
offices to the Security Council.

4 At the request of the Republican Government, an observation team
of the Committee of Good Offices investigated the situation in
Madura as a result of the Dutch military operation in East Madura
after 9 November 1947. The Australian observers reported on 8
January that the Dutch military action in Madura was inconsistent
with the Security Council's resolution of 1 August 1947. Another
observation team investigated an incident on 9 December 1947 in
Rawahgedeh in West Java. On 12 January the observation team found,
inter alia, that the Netherlands Army had acted ruthlessly and
deliberately in killing 150 Indonesians in this village which was
probably the headquarters of anti-Dutch resistance in the Krawang
area. The Sjarifuddin memorandum S/AC.10/73 of 21 December 1947
requested the Committee of Good Offices to investigate the Dutch
attempt to separate West Java from the Republic, Dutch preliminary
work for the establishment of an Indonesian federation and a radio
address by Beel on 19 December implying that the Republic had
declined to participate in an Indonesian federation.

5 The words in square brackets were added in what appears to be
Critchley's handwriting.


[AA:A1838, 403/3/1/1, xv]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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