1. Herewith gist of Hatta-Stikker talks.

2. Yesterday I called on Nehru of India at the Chancery. He
informs me that Pandit Nehru is personally exercising the greatest
pressure on the U.K. to make the Dutch abandon their plan for
military action. He also told me that the Indonesian-Dutch talks
at Kaliurang had struck a snag over the question of the Republican
Army. My impression is-Nehru had no details to offer-that the
Dutch are demanding its immediate abolition.

3. Soemitro phoned me yesterday to give me a press report
originating from Batavia and transmitted to us by Jogja. From that
I gather that Stikker was in Batavia on Dec 1. He is reported to
have said that 'the informal and unofficial discussions' had ended
and had been 'sufficient'. Asked if formal negotiations would
commence, he said: 'That is our hope. There is no reason for any
further delay.'
4. I called on Ispahani of Pakistan yesterday, and he has promised
to add his voice to the others re the State Department.

SUBSTANCE OF HATTA-STIKKER DISCUSSIONS AT THEIR FIRST MEETING AT
KALIURANG

The Hatta-Stikker discussions, entirely informal and for the
purpose of orientation, were undertaken on Dutch initiative,
apparently to find out the definitive viewpoints of the Republic
before the commencement of official talks based on the Cochran
plan.

Hatta took the opportunity to make known to Stikker certain
important matters.

The points raised by Hatta were reduced to writing at the request
of Stikker in the form of an aide memoire [1] for embodiment in
his report to the Dutch cabinet. The aide memoire touched only
upon questions of prime importance; matters of secondary
importance were not discussed between Hatta and Stikker.

Hatta emphasized the following:

[1. The Republic is firmly determined that talks leading in the
direction of a political agreement shall be held in the presence
of the Committee of Good Offices and be based on the Cochran plan.

2. The interim period shall begin as soon as possible, with
December 1, 1949, as the target date for its conclusion.

3. The interim period will fall into two phases; the beginning of
the first phase will be marked by the formation of a cabinet by
the Republic of Indonesia and the representative of the Dutch
Crown; simultaneously there will come into being an interim
representative body nominated by the constituent states on the
basis of proportional representation.

4. At the end of six months elections shall be held throughout
Indonesia for a Constituent Assembly.

5. The second phase will begin with the election of a president by
the Constituent Assembly; the president will call upon any
individual to form a cabinet, such individual thereupon becoming
prime minister.

6. The members of the cabinet shall be Indonesian citizens and the
cabinet, to which shall be given clearly defined powers, will be
responsible to the Constituent Assembly.

7. The Constituent Assembly shall delineate the member states,
establish a constitution for the United States of Indonesia, and
devise the statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.]

[The military problem is a thorny one.] [2] 'Hatta maintains that
the federal armed forces should remain under the control of the
interim government; the Dutch, however, are anxious to vest
control in the hands of the Crown Representative; this subject is
still in abeyance. The most difficult problem centres around the
powers of the Crown Representative. Hatta will only go so far as
to give him the power of veto and the right of final decision in
certain clearly defined matters.

Hatta is prepared to make a concession in the case of the Federal
Council and will not press for more than a third of the seats
being given to the Republic. Hatta is firmly of the opinion that
the Committee of Good Offices should remain seized of the
Indonesian question till the very moment the Dutch transfer
sovereignty to the U.S.I.'