I saw Palar and Soedjatmoko this afternoon as arranged.

The purpose of their request to see you was to discuss the tactics
to be followed in drawing the attention of the United Nations to
the Indonesian problem. While they believed that pressure on the
Dutch has so far been effective, they still did not exclude the
possibility of a strong Dutch action being taken in desperation.

However, they still felt disinclined to request a special meeting
of the Security Council to consider Indonesia, and in any case had
no instructions from their Government for this.

They suggested that there were two possible courses of action:

(a) Utilisation of the opportunity afforded by the presentation of
the Fourth Interim Report [2] to the Security Council for a member
of the Council (Australia or India) to seek assurances from the
United Nations that the work of the Good Offices Commission would
be allowed to continue.

(b) A discussion of the explosive situation in Indonesia in
Committee 1 or in the ad hoc Committee considering the progress of
business in the Security Council.

Palar also raised the question of what should be done if police
action were undertaken by the Dutch, and suggested that the
President and the Secretary-General of the United Nations might be
able to intervene as they had done in the Berlin matter, despite
the fact that the Security Council was seized with the Berlin
problem. [3] The action taken on Berlin, he thought, might serve
as a precedent for direct intervention in the case of Indonesia.

I told Palar that I would convey his observations to you and that
we would give the matter very careful consideration. I also told
him that we felt that it was desirable to check any military
action before it started.