Cablegram K40 BATAVIA, 16 January 1948, 2 p.m.
IMMEDIATE SECRET
Your telegrams 17 and 18. [1]
The proposals mentioned by Lacy [2] would be those I left for
telegraphing to you on leaving Batavia on Sunday 10th January. [3]
2. These proposals were adopted by the Committee in these
circumstances:-
(a) Without my prior knowledge, the Americans unilaterally
discussed the eight proposals [4] with the Dutch and when they
obtained local Dutch approval to six of them [5], submitted them
to the Committee for transmitting to the Republic as principles
accepted by the Dutch in advance subject to confirmation from The
Hague.
(b) The Committee brought them to Djokjakarta and here received
The Hague confirmation and then handed them to the Republic.
(c) In these circumstances I must be taken to have supported these
proposals of Graham but I have, to American annoyance, made it
clear that they did not go far enough and should have included, as
the first and urgent priority, immediate prohibition of Dutch
formation or sponsoring of new [ ... ] [6] without plebiscite and
also specific provisions for Republic's participation in the
Provisional Government and specific provisions for immediate
setting up of the latter with definition of powers an so on.
(d) Van Zeeland, of course, was fully satisfied with the proposals
once they were disclosed as having been accepted by the Dutch.
3. The Committee has repeatedly met the Republicans here and each
member has seen them informally. Van Zeeland quite specifically
advised them to accept, within extendance allowed, the Dutch truce
plan plus the twelve political points previously telegraphed to
you plus these latest six Points. [7] Graham who previously had
tried to sit on the fence came right down on the side of
acceptance even going to the limit of addressing the Republican
Cabinet and Delegations and a few other leaders. In this view he
made quite an oratorical and frenzied appeal with much table
thumping and said that the Republic would be foolish to reject and
if they did 'would lose heaviest'.
4. For obvious reasons I cannot go too far for fear of losing all
American help and support but it was tragic that American conceit
should have made them waste so much of value by way of political
and economic pressure on the Dutch by not insisting on two vital
matters set out in paragraph two (c) of this telegram. I say
'conceit' as the kindest way of explaining their unilateral method
of getting the Dutch agreement on their own proposals. Graham had
repeatedly told me that he had a 'King-hit' which he would use at
the right time and naturally I thought we would be in with him on
its use.
5. I have made it abundantly clear that I would not join in an
approach to the Republic by [...] of the Dutch truce plan even
[...] the eighteen political principles and had informed the