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21 Kirby to Burton

Cablegram K40 BATAVIA, 16 January 1948, 2 p.m.

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Your telegrams 17 and 18. [1]

The proposals mentioned by Lacy [2] would be those I left for
telegraphing to you on leaving Batavia on Sunday 10th January. [3]

2. These proposals were adopted by the Committee in these
circumstances:-

(a) Without my prior knowledge, the Americans unilaterally
discussed the eight proposals [4] with the Dutch and when they
obtained local Dutch approval to six of them [5], submitted them
to the Committee for transmitting to the Republic as principles
accepted by the Dutch in advance subject to confirmation from The
Hague.

(b) The Committee brought them to Djokjakarta and here received
The Hague confirmation and then handed them to the Republic.

(c) In these circumstances I must be taken to have supported these
proposals of Graham but I have, to American annoyance, made it
clear that they did not go far enough and should have included, as
the first and urgent priority, immediate prohibition of Dutch
formation or sponsoring of new [ ... ] [6] without plebiscite and
also specific provisions for Republic's participation in the
Provisional Government and specific provisions for immediate
setting up of the latter with definition of powers an so on.

(d) Van Zeeland, of course, was fully satisfied with the proposals
once they were disclosed as having been accepted by the Dutch.

3. The Committee has repeatedly met the Republicans here and each
member has seen them informally. Van Zeeland quite specifically
advised them to accept, within extendance allowed, the Dutch truce
plan plus the twelve political points previously telegraphed to
you plus these latest six Points. [7] Graham who previously had
tried to sit on the fence came right down on the side of
acceptance even going to the limit of addressing the Republican
Cabinet and Delegations and a few other leaders. In this view he
made quite an oratorical and frenzied appeal with much table
thumping and said that the Republic would be foolish to reject and
if they did 'would lose heaviest'.

4. For obvious reasons I cannot go too far for fear of losing all
American help and support but it was tragic that American conceit
should have made them waste so much of value by way of political
and economic pressure on the Dutch by not insisting on two vital
matters set out in paragraph two (c) of this telegram. I say
'conceit' as the kindest way of explaining their unilateral method
of getting the Dutch agreement on their own proposals. Graham had
repeatedly told me that he had a 'King-hit' which he would use at
the right time and naturally I thought we would be in with him on
its use.

5. I have made it abundantly clear that I would not join in an
approach to the Republic by [...] of the Dutch truce plan even


Republic of this. In fact I feel sure that it was the stiff
Australian attitude on [...] the Dutch ultimatum both to the
Committee and to the Republic that produced the six points.

6. A repetition of this attitude has now led to a few more
concessional changes in the truce plan by the Dutch and a
statement by the Committee on the six points which could help the
Republic considerably in future fight. [8]

7. When Van Zeeland moved a motion that the Committee comply with
a Dutch written request that in return for six latest political
[...], Committee sponsor the Dutch truce plan. I refused to second
it and it lapsed. I then stated I thought the truce plan unjust
and that I wanted to make it clear in the event of the Republic
rejecting it I would report to the Security Council and would
argue the Republic was fully justified in such action.

8. In view of the American attitude which was obviously State
Department inspired, I could not advise the Republic to reject but
I made it clear Australia would support them in the event of
rejection or acceptance. Graham and Van Zeeland were informed of
this attitude and it led to Van Zeeland returning to Batavia last
night to endeavour to obtain further concessions before noon today
which was the zero hour set.

9. The Republic just before noon today did accept the Dutch truce
plan as modified plus the eighteen political points plus the three
Dutch clarifications [9] obtained last night plus the six
statements to the parties by the Committee.

10. In my opinion that truce is most unjust but there is a chance
that a strong Committee plus political pressure sensibly applied
this time might save the Republic.

11. Present plans are to have the truce formally signed on
Renville on Saturday and announce other political principles
accepted and then immediately continue substantive discussions.

12. I propose returning by our plane on Sunday morning. This is
with the full approval of the Republican Prime Minister and
Cabinet who are most anxious that I support them at Lake Success
for which place Graham and Van Zeeland propose leaving direct on
Monday or early next week. I will have to return then to catch
them at Lake Success.

13. The important provisions in the political points are those for
plebiscites and those that will keep the Committee here right up
to the Political Agreement and transfer sovereignty if the
Republic require and if the Security Council realizes now the
necessity for this. Here I feel that we will get full American
support but it will need the strongest pressure from us.

14. Lack of facilities and full staff here and preoccupation
prevent my telegraphing the text of clarifications and Committee
statements referred to above but I will return to Batavia tomorrow
and cable them from there. [10]

15. Brookes has been invaluable to me but he is ill and will
return with me. There are a number of recommendations which I wish
to put personally to you as being urgently necessary and hope to
see you on Monday or Tuesday.

16. Critchley has been doing a great job and the Republic are very
pleased that he is able to stay on. He is thoroughly welcome to
them in my place.

17. Since writing the above I have received your telegram 19 and
will consult Graham and Van Zeeland thereon and cable you
tomorrow.

[AA:A1838, 403/3/1/1, xiv]

1 Both dispatched on 14 January, cablegram 17 conveyed the text of
Document 16 and Cablegram 18 requested information from Kirby
about the nature of Graham's proposals, whether Kirby had
supported Graham and about the Republic's attitude to his
proposals.

2 See Document 16.

3 Kirby in fact left for Djokjakarta on Sunday 11 January (see
Document 13).

4 A reference to the first eight proposals of Document 8.

5 The six proposals approved of by the NEI authorities are listed
in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1948, vol. VI, Washington, 1974, p.73.

6 The text contains symbols denoting mutilated characters, but
without explanation. Where these occur an ellipsis in square
bracken has been inserted to indicate the likelihood of a missing
word or words. The missing word here is presumably 'states'.

7 Documents 7, 8 and 13.

8 A reference to the 61st Meeting of the Committee of Good Offices
with the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia at Kaliurang on
13 January recorded in S/AC.10/SR.61. In this meeting the
Committee of Good offices answered questions from the Republican
Delegation about the meaning of the Six Additional Principles.

Members of the Committee expressed the view that until the
Republic of Indonesia became a constituent state of the United
States of Indonesia, its status would remain unaffected by the Six
Principles. Kirby personally argued the following points: in
conferring certain rights and responsibilities on the Provisional
Federal Government of the future United States of Indonesia, the
Netherlands would be 'diminishing to a proportionate extent its
sovereignty'; whether the Provisional Government could conclude
its own commercial and trade agreements would come within the
scope of political negotiations after the truce agreement; on the
matter of whether the Republic could continue its foreign
relations, nothing in the Six Principles could prevent it 'from
carrying on the way it had been carrying on, until something to
the century was agreed on by the parties themselves.'
9 These Dutch clarifications are listed in the annexe to Document
22.

10 In Cablegram K42, dispatched on 16 January, Kirby conveyed the
text of the three clarifications (Document 22, Annexe) but
indicated that he would personally convey the text of the
Committee statements (summarised in note 8 above) to Australia.


[...] the eighteen political principles and had informed the
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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