On instructions from Van Zeeland, Herremans has asked that the
corrigenda [1] to the summary record of the 61st meeting at
Kaliurang on January 13th [2] be incorporated in a completely
revised summary record. You will recall that the corrigenda
include the revision agreed by the original members of the
Committee in New York many weeks after the Kaliurang meeting and
after the time limit for submitting corrigenda had expired.

Herremans argued that there were so many corrections to be made
that it would be difficult to consider them without a new complete
document.

I was personally reluctant to agree, partly because the proposal
was contrary to our agreed procedure, partly because the issue of
a new document with a serial number would destroy the status of
the original summary record, and partly because the issue of the
new document to the parties would have an unsettling psychological
effect on the Republicans. As a compromise, it was eventually
agreed that, in order to preserve the status of the original
summary record any new record would not be counted as an official
document nor given a serial number, but would be prefaced by a
short statement explaining its precise nature. I suggested that
this statement should make it clear that the new revised record
was issued at the request of the Belgian representative. This was
unsatisfactory to Herremans and it was therefore agreed that the
preface should say that the new record was 'compiled and issued at
the request of the original representatives of the Committee of
Good Offices in order to facilitate a reading of the record
together with the corrigenda', but that the record should not be
issued until approval was obtained from each of the original
representatives on the Good Offices Committee.

In accordance with this decision, I am enclosing a copy of the new
compilation for your approval or otherwise. [3] Delay in obtaining
approval is inevitable and the procedure agreed upon as good as
kills Van Zeeland's proposal. In other words, if you are at all
uncertain as to whether you wish to agree with Van Zeeland's
proposal, I suggest you do no more than hang on to this document.

There is little to report on developments of the last fortnight.

The talks are still in process of settling down and it is largely
a matter of the parties exploring their respective positions in
informal discussions. Originally we endeavoured to carry out
discussions in Committee meetings but the difficulty of coping
with three languages and translations, and in fact four languages
when Herremans was chairman, soon showed that if we were to reach
any agreement the discussions would have to start with informal
across-the-table talks in one language.

In the informal across-the-table talks, discussions of the two
papers on the 'scope of the eventual political agreement'
revealed, I understand, two outstanding points of difference. [4]
These concerned the plebiscite and foreign affairs. The
Republicans claim the plebiscite should be held only in the
Netherlands occupied areas. They know their case is weak but they
are motivated by political difficulties in the Republic and they
fear the psychological effect of proposals which contemplate,
however remotely, the division of the Republic. Nevertheless they
realise they will have to give way and I believe they will prepare
for this.

With regard to foreign affairs the Netherlands are stressing that
as the sovereign power they must be responsible in the interim
period. The Republic, on the other hand, is prepared to hand over
their foreign affairs to an interim government providing that
interim government has real power such as the right to approve
treaties which affect Indonesia. The Dutch are adamant and
deadlock may develop on this issue. For the time being, the
Republic intends to suggest that the subject be left for later
consideration when other issues are clearer. I need hardly stress
that the right of Indonesians to have a say in matters affecting
the foreign relations of these Islands may be extremely important
to Australia even in a short interim period.

Informal discussions on the United States of Indonesia seem to be
going reasonably well. Where there are differences of opinion the
parties follow the simple device of agreeing that the problem is
one for the 'Constituent Assembly'.

The Netherlands still appears to be confusing the issue by making
numerous complaints at the slightest provocation and on some
occasions with, to my mind, no provocation.

There is also a marked tendency for the Dutch, in their approach
to the problems under discussion, to look back on the position as
it existed before the war and to seek to return there rather than
face up to the formation of a United States of Indonesia and to
make proposals leading up to this final settlement.

I have been giving special attention to the need of developing
trade between the two areas. We are getting somewhere with local
trade but there is as yet no prospect of the Republic being
permitted to trade with outside countries direct. In this
connection the announcement of the trade agreement between Malaya,
Singapore and the NEI is a serious blow. [5] The full effects
cannot yet be estimated but it will certainly restrict the
Republic.

In committee, Van Vredenburch has skilfully put Roem. in a
position in which the Republic appears to be stalling. I have
already mentioned my misgivings about the leader of the Republican
delegation and now reinforce them. In part, the difficulty may be
Roem's inability to conduct discussions in English, but he gives,
both in appearance and in speech, the impression of a man who lets
a lot pass over his head. Hatta, on his way to Bukittinggi in our
plane, was in Batavia yesterday afternoon, when we had a long
chat. I endeavoured to sow some seeds of doubt and suggested a
strengthening of the delegation, but I had to be extremely careful
as Roem is obviously a close and trusted confidante of the Vice
President.

Hatta did not say so, but there are still many political
undercurrents in the Republic. I am informed, for example, that
our friend Setiadjit is playing a waiting and watching game and
will not be unhappy to find an opportunity to embarrass the
Government. Sjahrir is playing canny. He has been asked by Hatta
to return from Singapore but is stalling unashamedly. The
Republic's position would be far stronger if they could submerge
their political differences and ambitions for the time being, at
least until the establishment of the U.S.I.

Criticism of the Committee's publicity arrangements has for the
time being abated. I was in a minority in pressing for the
appointment of a public relations officer, but in effect we will
have much the same thing, as the Committee has now agreed that one
of the new members of the Secretariat, the assistant head, who is
reputed to have press experience, will be given the primary task
of looking after the Committee's press relations. The storm while
it raged was useful in obtaining a general agreement that
publicity should be extended. Van Vredenburch continues, however,
to seek the restriction of any publicity without both parties'
consent, and he has the ear of the other two members of the
Committee.

I feel that a key to the situation here will be Dutch policy in
the structure of the Netherlands-USI Union. The Netherlands
delegation is under instructions not to discuss it at this stage.

As you know, there are two points of view, one that Indonesia
should be tied to the Netherlands in the strongest possible
fashion and with the creation of a special structure, the other
that the agreement should be loose in treaty form and only
concerned with matters in which there is a real mutual interest.

Tahiya, East Indonesian representative here and a member of the
Dutch delegation ('with whom I have established the most friendly
relations') assures me that the Netherlands have sent out a paper
which goes a remarkable way in providing for the freedom of the
USI. He says the proposal is so generous that he feels sure it
will cause trouble in the Netherlands and possibly affect the
election plans of the present government. You also will probably
scent propaganda in this latter statement. Tahiya is not averse to
creating a wrong impression, so I take his statement under
advisement with suspicion.