Many thanks for your letter of 26th February [1] and the copies of
some of the recent telegrams exchanged with judge Kirby when he
was at New York.

Departmental telegram No.64 [2] was received yesterday, and no
doubt you had a hand in it. I was most happy to find that
departmental views accord so closely to my own. Needless to say, I
agree with all the points mentioned. At the same time, it will not
be easy for the Committee to capture the initiative. Now that the
substantive talks have commenced, it is for the time being
impossible. if, however, there is a lack of progress in the
discussions, or irreconcilable views develop, it will clearly be
necessary for the Committee to take a lead by making suggestions
and publicising them. The greatest difficulty will be Dubois, an
old Indonesian hand and a close personal friend of Van der Plaas.

He is very pro-Dutch; I am tempted to say the most pro-Dutch
American since Billy Foote. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, but
not much of a one. Moreover, the Americans have established very
close contact with the Netherlands delegation, with the result
that Scott discusses most matters in detail with them in advance.

While the American policy is obviously to encourage the
Netherlands to compromise towards a settlement, this arrangement
has serious disadvantages. When Van Zeeland was the confidante of
the Netherlands, the Americans provided a further softening
influence in the Committee. Now, when important issues are raised
in Committee, there is no check. The Americans are usually
committed to supporting the Netherlands point of view and the task
of Herremans is simple indeed.

Nevertheless, the Americans seem anxious to achieve a political
agreement on the Renville principles, and Van Vredenburch has
expressed the hope that such an agreement will be achieved within
three months. Perhaps he has in mind the need for an agreement
before the constitution is revised at The Hague. The possibility
that such a revision will not go through seems to be another big
question mark on the horizon and it would be useful if we could be
kept informed of reports on this issue from The Hague.

The political discussions began today in a reasonably favourable
atmosphere. You will have seen from my K.93 that quite a detailed
programme has been suggested for the talks. While some of the
headings may not be entirely satisfactory, e.g. No.8Future status
of the autonomous native states-I believe the publication of this
list will have the valuable effect of nailing the Netherlands
publicly to the widest possible discussions in the Political
Committee.

I agree that the Republicans should show no haste to join the new
provisional government and that we should seek, in the Political
Committee to ensure a satisfactory general political settlement
before we even consider the structure and the participation of the
Republic in an interim federal government. Whether this proves
practicable or not, we have at least succeeded in ensuring that
the first political talks are on the structure of the United
States of Indonesia.

Discussions began yesterday in the Economic and Financial
Committee. As Chairman of the week, I was able to focus attention
on the opening up of trade and communications. Plenty of pushing
and shoving will be necessary, but it may be possible to get
somewhere on the basis of Article 6 of the Truce Agreement. [3] I
have also arranged for the Committee's military representatives to
recommend that the directives to the military observers in the
field be widened so as to give observers an opportunity to report
on such matters as trade restrictions. The Bantam area is a good
example of the serious effects the Dutch blockade is having, and I
was glad to receive approval for submitting a minority report if
necessary on this matter. Only yesterday the Republic applied for
permission to ship a large quantity of sugar to Bantam, and I
intend to seek an early decision on this question.

Certainly the Republic is far from being beyond help; as telegram
64 states, the election of Wiranatakusumah as head of West Java is
a most hopeful sign. My first reactions were that this was a move
by the Dutch to counter the recent Chinese resolution' in the
Security Council. This view was, I later discovered, supported by
editorials in the Republican press. However, it has since become
clear that the Dutch were not nearly as happy about the
development as they appeared. It will be interesting to see
whether the Republic succeeds in having its nominee appointed
Prime Minister of the new State. The Republic has nominated an
outstanding candidate in Raden Noesoema Atmadja, who is at present
Attorney General at Jogjakarta and a most respected citizen of
West Java pre-war. If Koesoema Atmadja is appointed, the Republic
will control the Cabinet and, in effect, the State itself.

West Java is not the only Dutch headache following the creation of
new states. As I have pointed out earlier, East Indonesia is not
behaving and there are now indications that East Sumatra is not
going as well as the Dutch would like.

According to members of the Committee and the Secretariat, the
foreign press boys of Batavia are misbehaving. They have strongly
protested to Trygve Lie about the lack of cooperation on publicity
from the Committee and the Secretariat, and they have requested
that a public relations officer be appointed. The trouble with the
press dates back to the first days of the Committee's work in
Batavia. The pressmen's excuse for going straight to the Secretary
General of the United Nations is that their request to the
Committee for greater cooperation made in November last brought no
result. Apart from the possibilities that it will provide Russia
with ammunition, and perhaps tend to discredit the Committee, I
personally find the attack most refreshing and it will certainly
help me in the difficult task of endeavouring to keep the Dutch
honest and in the open. I intend to do what I can to support the
recommendation, which is in fact similar to one I have already
made myself to the Secretariat.

Until this week, staffing difficulties have not been as great as I
feared. The delay in the start of the substantive talks helped.

With the beginning of these talks, and with Cutts absent in
Singapore [5], this week has however been hectic. Nevertheless I
am hopeful that, with Cutts' return tomorrow, we shall be able to
manage in the future; that is, of course, providing present
numbers are maintained. I should like to take this opportunity to
warn you that Miss Skidmore, who is a tower of strength on the
secretarial side, is due to return to Australia some time in
April, and I should be glad if you could bear in mind the need of
replacing her with somebody nearly as efficient.

As this is a personal letter, I have sought to avoid raising new
issues, but have aimed merely to give you a little additional
background on matters already reported. I hope this is of use.