SOLOMON ISLANDS SITUATION

[matter omitted]

3. The question of further action on our part arises. The
following considerations are relevant:

(a) If we proceed to offer our services by means of exchange of
ideas and advice derived from our own experience, we may be
associated in the minds of ill-informed outside critics, with the
repressive measures [1] employed and also with the possible
ultimate failure to devise real remedies for a situation that
could continue for some time and even worsen.

(b) On the other hand this region is one in which we are directly
concerned. The whole purpose of the South Pacific Commission
Agreement is to promote cooperation in the examination of problems
relating to the living standards of the native peoples in the
South West Pacific.

(c) I feel, frankly, that Australia's reputation will depend more
upon its ability to provide constructive solutions of such
problems (as it will attempt to do in Indonesia) than upon its
success in merely drawing attention to the existence of problems
in the South West Pacific and South East Asia.

(d) It is within the letter and spirit of the South Pacific
Commission Agreement that exchange of views should be encouraged
even on matters which have the appearance of being political but
have fundamental economic and social causes.

4. On balance, it is suggested that we [sh]ould [2] be well
advised to take [a] more positive interest in the Solomon Islands
situation and as a step in that direction a cable could be sent to
the Commonwealth Relations Office or alternatively, if you prefer,
a letter to the United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office
stressing our general interest in the situation and drawing
particular attention to the proximity of Australian mandated
territory. We could emphasise our readiness to make available
information derived from our experience in handling natives of the
Solomons mandated area and in parts of the territory of New Guinea
in which there has been any lengthy contact with United States
forces. We could suggest that possibly a meeting [might] be
arranged between [the] British Resident Commissioner in the area
and the Administrator of Papua - New Guinea to exchange ideas on
recent developments and on constructive solutions affecting the
economic and administrative structure of the territories under
consideration. (it is possible that from such discussions there
would emerge a realisation that the trouble in the Solomons has
been partly caused by shortages of essential materials and
supplies. In such circumstances Australia might be expected to
make a special effort to assist and indeed we could hardly justify
our assertion of direct interest in the area unless we were
prepared to carry some of the obligations).

5. Finally it is quite possible that the Colonial Office may at
first glance resent [our] desire to 'intervene'. I feel that a lot
will depend on the way in which the approach is made and would
suggest for your consideration that if it is pursued on the lines
suggested above it might be possible to make progress towards a
constructive solution. Efforts made by Australia in this
direction, incidentally, could well be mentioned in our annual
report to the Trusteeship Council on the Mandated Territory of New
Guinea and would assist in enhancing our prestige.

[6. Territories [3] should, of course, be consulted as to the
terms of any such communication. From my conversations with them I
feel that they would not be opposed to action being taken on the
above lines.] [4]