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538 Australian Delegation, United Nations, to Department of External Affairs

Cablegram UN1041 NEW YORK, 28 October 1947, 6.33 p.m.

IMMEDIATE SECRET

The following is the text of Dr. Evatt's statement to Committee
1[1] today:-

The future of Korea is a matter of concern to the Japanese
settlement affecting both East Asia and the Pacific. Korea became
part of the Empire of Japan after its annexation in 1910, and
legally Japan will retain sovereignty until she formally cedes it
in Peace Treaty. The question before the Committee is whether the
United Nations should itself take the initiative in establishing a
Korean Government.

The broad pattern of Korea's future has been planned by various
Allied declarations. The Cairo Declaration stated that 'in due
course Korea shall become free and independent.' This was
confirmed in the Potsdam Declaration which was accepted by Japan
when she signed the terms of surrender. The Moscow Conference of
December 1945 went further, and set out concrete steps to be taken
to achieve Korean independence. A joint commission of the United
States and U.S.S.R. representatives was to assist in the
establishment of a provisional Korean Government and submit
proposals to the Governments of the United States of America,
U.S.S.R., China and the United Kingdom for the establishment of
such a Government and for placing Korea under a Four Power
Trusteeship for a period of up to five years.

Australia's interest in Korea is twofold-
(1) Australia's armies played a major part in the defeat of Japan,
fighting in numerous areas from December 1941 until the final
surrender of Japan.

(2) The Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy took
part in action on nearly all fronts against the Japanese.

She gave big supplies of food, munitions, and war materials for
her own use and that of her Allies. The magnitude of her war
effort entitles Australia to be regarded as a party principal in
the Japanese Peace Settlement, and in any preliminary negotiations
such as those concerning the future of Korea. Australian and other
British Commonwealth Forces are still in Japan under the able
leadership of General Macarthur, who is Supreme Commander, and
where American Forces constitute the main element of his Command.

The Soviet Representative at the Plenary Assembly argued that
Article 107 of the Charter completely bars the United Nations from
considering Korea. That is a misreading of the Article. It is true
that the Charter contemplated that Peace Settlements would be made
outside the Organization. In spite of that the United Nations is
not debarred from considering situations arising from settlements
or from failure to make them.

However, there are two working rules which this Assembly should
recognize if its prestige is to be maintained.

1. The Assembly of the United Nations should not undertake any
arrangements that it cannot fulfil efficiently.

2. The Assembly of the United Nations should not, except as a last
resort, intervene in relation to matters which are likely to
constitute an integral part of the Peace Settlement.

When the Charter was drafted, the San Francisco Conference did not
foresee long delay that would occur in signing the treaties of
peace. This delay and absence of settlements with major enemy
powers is a severe impediment to the work of the United Nations,
because neither European nor Eastern Asian regions can begin
longterm planning on any sound basis until the political and
economic conditions of peace settlements have been laid down.

I agree with the Soviet Representative that agreement along the
lines of the Moscow Declaration would have been desirable. Two
powers have now had nearly two years to carry out in agreement the
duties imposed on them by the Declaration, and if agreement could
not be reached in that time, it is unlikely that further recourse
to the same procedure would be successful.

The logical place for the next step to begin is the Japanese Peace
Conference where representatives of all the powers which made a
direct contribution towards Pacific victory would be represented.

But I suggest conversations at once-here and now-between the two
countries now in control in Korea. If, neither of these courses is
immediately practicable, Australia would not oppose the
establishment of a United Nations Commission for Korea. [2]

The membership of the Commission should primarily be contributed
from those powers which made a direct contribution towards Pacific
victory. Such a Commission could and should be regarded as a
preliminary part of the entire Japanese Peace Settlement, the
actual ceding of sovereignty being left to the Peace Treaty.

Australia desires a settlement in Korea that will be in the
interests of Korean people and will help to establish the basis of
a just and lasting peace in this region of Asia. The new Korean
State should be established in such a way as to promote a growth
of democracy in that country and allow her to achieve sound
economic, political, and social development in peaceful
association with all her neighbours and the rest of the world.

What should this Committee do?
1. We should request the Powers interested, especially the United
States of America and U.S.S.R. to begin immediate conversations,
here and now, at the United Nations, with a view to an agreed
settlement.

2. If it appears that the course I suggest is impossible and if
the Peace Conference cannot be convened very promptly, I will
support the United States of America proposal in principle.

3 . As to the composition of the Commission and its precise powers
and duties, I reserve my right of further analysis.

1 That is, the Political and Security Committee of the UN General
Assembly, a committee of 'the whole'.

2 A course favoured by the United States.


[AA : A1838, 539/1/1]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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