Extracts SINGAPORE, 24 December 1947

SECRET

PART III RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SUGGESTIONS FOR AN AUSTRALIAN POLICY TOWARDS BURMA

121. Australia is a country about which the Burmese have hitherto
known very little. Certain educated circles have realised that it
was a British Dominion but, even among these, few have realised
what degree of progress, economically and socially, has been
reached by Australia, or what measure it has attained of
independence in international relations. The war and what is
regarded as Australian championship of the Indonesian Republic
have changed all this, and there is now a keen interest in, even
an admiration for, Australia, which in the case of Burma is not
counterbalanced by any feeling of resentment against the racial
implications of the White Australia Policy. The Burmese are
unfamiliar with this policy and I was only catechised on it by the
Deputy Secretary U Tha Din, among all the Burmese I met. He was
not very convinced by my hedging, but fortunately the colour bar
is not a real issue in Burma. There is a considerable Anglo-Burman
community in this tolerant Buddhist land which is as acceptable to
the Burmese as the Europeans.

122. Australian foodstuffs crowd the Rangoon shops, and as other
Australian products find their way to Burma the possibilities of
closer commercial relations with Australia are constantly before
the eyes of the Burmese authorities. In education, too, the
possibility of increasing the present number of Burmese studying
in Australian universities is looked upon with favour,
particularly because it is cheaper to send state scholars to
Australia than to the United States of America or to the United
Kingdom.

123. A new development is the growth of interest in Australia
politically. The part played by Australia in international affairs
since the war, the way in which Dr Evatt is considered a champion
of small nations, and the Australian defence of the Indonesian
Republic, regarded as a persecuted Asian community under colonial
domination and as such the 'fair game' of the west, have kindled
Burmese interest considerably. It is also a fact that the present
Burmese government feels itself very much a shorn sheep on the
cold uplands of independent statehood, and is looking around for a
kind shepherd. It was made clear to me in Rangoon for instance
that the Burmese government would like to see generally closer
relations with Australia because this would afford them both
contact with the West and closer association with what they regard
as their own part of the world, that is, South-east Asia.

124. If it is right to assume that Australian security depends
upon the freedom of South-east Asia from great power domination,
and that the development of its independence and welfare is vital
to us, then the independence and progress of Burma are major
Australian interests. As in Indonesia, so in Burma, Australia has
an opportunity open to no other western nation; it can offer the
economic advantages of other western nations without the political
disadvantages that so often go with the former, for Australia is
not strong enough in numbers or military weight to be a source of
fear. The Burmese would welcome Australian diplomatic and
commercial support after the transfer of power, and might look in
time to Australia for leadership. As it is so manifestly to our
advantage that they should, there seems every argument in favour
of a forward policy now so far as Burma is concerned.

125. Australia does not want to see, at some future date, the
borders of a Japanese, Chinese, or Indian empire reaching to Java
and Timor. A guarantee against this is the maintenance of a region
of independent buffer states. These include Siam, Burma and
Indochina as well as the Philippines and Indonesia. It is probably
inevitable that we come to regard Burma sooner or later as a
country whose defence is vital to the security of Australia. This
being so the present anxiety of the Burmese leaders for closer
relations with ourselves provides an opportunity to start well,
and it is my recommendation that the Australian Government should
open a diplomatic mission in Rangoon as soon as possible, as a
first step in a process of greater penetration of the Union. From
such a beginning it is not too much to hope that greater political
understanding generally will follow; this is quite likely if the
Australian representative is accessible, patient and friendly and
has something positive to offer. It might also be possible to make
known to the Burmese that in matters concerning the independence
and security of their country they can rely upon Australian
support at the United Nations.

2. AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATION IN BURMA

126. At our earliest conversation together the then Secretary for
Foreign Affairs asked me if Australia proposed to open a
diplomatic mission in Burma. This was usually the first question
put to me by all Burmese officials. At the conclusion of my first
interview with him the Minister for Foreign Affairs raised the
issue himself with the opening, 'Well I suppose we had better do
something about reciprocal representation.'

[matter omitted] [2]

129. From my discussions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs it
emerged that the Burmese have in mind an exchange of diplomatic
representatives and at a high level. I have outlined in the
preceding section my own views on the value of an exchange with
Burma. It follows from this that I hope personally the Government
will agree to diplomatic representation there. I felt it would be
wise all the same to tell U Tin Tut that we had no diplomatic
representation in South-east Asia, and that manpower and financial
difficulties had limited us, for instance in the Philippines, to a
consular mission. The Burmese are however in an exalted mood on
the eve of their independence, and they feel that the recognition
of that independence abroad will be the degree of importance
attached by foreign countries to their representation at Rangoon.

There are only six missions here: United Kingdom, United States,
China, Siam, India and Pakistan. All are embassies. French and
Dutch missions have not yet been established but are about to be.

The Burmese clearly hope that Australia will establish an Embassy
in Rangoon, and the fact that they wish to open a mission in
Australia with their very limited resources is, in their eyes, a
sufficient compliment for Australia to concede them the highest
form of diplomatic representation in return.

130. I am quite unaware of Australian intentions in this regard.

If however it is our aim to open a post here, any suggestion of
consular representation would badly disappoint the Burmese and
would to my mind be better not made. The figures given above are
those for the smallest mission that would be of any value to us in
Burma, and it will not be possible to have representation there at
less cost. In the circumstances I see no objection, and every
advantage, in giving it a style which would please the Burmese.