My telegram 8th October No. 220.

I am sorry that there has been some delay in replying to your
telegram No. 265 about the withdrawal of the United Kingdom Forces
from Japan, but we have had to re-examine the whole question in
the light of your views.

2. We appreciate your desire to retain a number of the United
Kingdom component of B.C.O.F., and we agree in principle to the
retention of certain specialist and key members of the Army and of
No. 1415 Communication Flight. The number of service men to be
retained in Japan will, of course, affect the revised totals for
the United Kingdom services and our service authorities will,
therefore, need to have exact numbers of those whose services you
wish to retain before giving final agreement to your proposals. I
understand that an estimate of the numbers likely to be involved
has already been sent to our service authorities and I hope that
it will be possible for them to be notified of the exact figures
as soon as possible.

3. I am afraid that the reduction we must make in the strength of
the British Pacific Fleet (about which I shall shortly be
telegraphing to you in greater detail) means that we must withdraw
completely the United Kingdom contribution to Naval Force 'T'.

However, it will, no doubt, be possible for Naval Units from the
British Pacific Fleet to be temporarily for short periods to
Japanese waters if required. We had intended also to withdraw the
entire Naval Port Party Kure, but, in view of what you say, we
agree that the Party should remain, provided that it is
progressively reduced as rapidly as possible and finally withdrawn
as soon as you can make alternative arrangements.

4. We should be glad if you would now make the necessary formal
approach to the United States Government.

5. My personal representative with General MacArthur informed me
that, when he first told the Supreme Commander of our decision,
MacArthur suggested that for publicity purposes some mention might
be made in the eventual announcement about the withdrawal that it
has been made possible by the success achieved by the military
administration of Japan. Though this reason is, from our point of
view, subsidiary to the main reason for withdrawal, which I set
out in my telegram of 28th September, I think you will wish to
know of the Supreme Commander's suggestion, which, personally, I
should be quite prepared to accept. [1]