With reference to Telegram 29 from the Prime Minister of New
Zealand and
Saving Telegram No. 3 from the Dominions Office, the draft
telegram attached is forwarded by direction of the Minister for
External Affairs for favour of your comments. [1]

Attachment

B.C.O.F.

Your 29.

1. We assume that you will be giving further consideration to this
matter in light of the United Kingdom Saving telegram NO. 3
(Wellington No.4). Meanwhile we offer the following comments.

2. We appreciate the force of the reasons which incline your
Government to reduce its contingent in Japan and we are
considering the proposals in your telegram in regard to reduction
of numbers.

3. We are disturbed, however, by your doubts as to the value of
continued participation by B.C.O.F. in the military occupation. We
feel as we have always felt that it is essential for our
Governments to share in the obligations involved in the
maintenance of security in the Pacific and that it is imperative
to share in the military occupation of Japan, at least until the
terms of the peace settlement and the future control mechanism in
Japan are decided.

4. We feel for our part that any move in the direction of a
withdrawal from the occupation now would weaken our undoubted
claim and right to participate as a principal in the peace
settlement, and would strengthen any tendency to under-rate our
value as a factor in the development of security and welfare in
the Pacific.

5. In the meantime we are concerned to make the best of F.E.C. and
the Allied Council for Japan. We do not think that participation
in the work of these bodies is of negligible value. The United
States authorities have on occasions responded to pressure through
those two institutions and the symbolic importance of membership
alone is considerable. The willingness of the U.S. Government to
pay attention to the views of other Governments on questions
affecting occupation policy has undoubtedly been due in some
measure to the fact that the occupation of Japan has not been
entirely an American responsibility.

6. In regard to prestige in the eyes of the Japanese we feel that
the long-term result may well depend rather upon the quality of
our force than upon its size. We believe that from the point of
view of general behaviour and bearing of the British forces have
made a considerable impression upon the local population.

7. A long-term consideration of great importance which also
affects our appreciation of the value of participating in the
military occupation is raised by the United Kingdom Government in
the telegram referred to above, in which it is suggested that the
area under occupation by British Forces might well be extended to
include an area of greater social, economic and political
importance in the life of the country, such as Kobe. This port was
the centre of approximately one third of Japan's pre-war foreign
trade. The long-term economic and commercial considerations
mentioned in para. 6 of the U.K. cable appear convincing. We would
be glad to undertake negotiations with the United States
authorities if General Robertson's report on the proposal were
favourable.