IMMEDIATE

Security 219.

1. Our Security 220 contains draft Australian Resolution on
disarmament which is submitted for your consideration with a view
to placing it before the Security Council next Wednesday morning.

2. In drafting the resolution we have based ourselves squarely on
the General Assembly resolution of December 14th in order to gain
the greatest strength possible from unanimous adoption of that
resolution. The preamble borrows some phrases from the Soviet
resolution but the operative part is mainly a quotation from
various sections of the Assembly resolution. One of our main
purposes is to try to obtain concurrent action so as to avoid both
any dispute over priorities and any attempt to prejudice the
Atomic Energy Commission while at the same time recognising the
strength of the argument for appointment of commission to prepare
proposals on General Disarmament.

3. The main difficulties before the Council are ...

(A) lack of unanimity on certain parts of Atomic Energy
Commission's first report. These possibly include some sections
besides those referring to veto and Soviet position regarding
report is not yet wholly clear.

(B) unwillingness of the United States to proceed further until
Atomic Energy Report has been approved although we believe that
the United States, given a brief delay, might be prepared to
accept the resolution by Council taking note of Atomic Report as
sufficient for immediate purposes.

(C) unwillingness of Soviet to consider Atomic Energy Report first
and probable desire on their part to divert attention from the
Atomic Energy report and even sidetrack Atomic Energy Commission
by creating Disarmament Commission.

Soviet views are indefinite and possibly the best way of
clarifying them is by precise definition of functions of the new
commission. Grouping the commission's establishment in one
resolution with instruction to the Atomic Energy Commission to
proceed should make it clear that neither excludes the other.

4. Our general suggestion regarding procedure is that if possible
the Atomic Energy Commission might be encouraged to continue work
along the lines of its report without waiting for the Security
Council's formal approval of report and that at the same time the
new commission might commence work on general disarmament. Co-
ordination could be ensured by almost identical membership of both
commissions and by the fact that their work could be under review
by the Security Council. While making these suggestions we would
stress that the outlook is by no means bright and the General
Assembly resolution which was result of various conflicting
purposes was probably premature and does not in reality express
unanimity. Its tortuous terms rather than the unanimous vote for
its adoption indicate its true nature.