The following background information and tentative comments are
submitted to assist you in reaching policy decisions on
disarmament.

1. The question comes before the Security Council through-
A. General Assembly resolution of December 14th, Disarmament. [1]

B. Atomic Commission's Interim Report.

C. Subsidiary but related Assembly resolution on troops in foreign
territory.

2. During past examinations at United Nations headquarters we have
witnessed-
A. Period when all Soviet activities within United Nations clearly
subserved current contests in Europe.

B. Period following the close of the Paris Conference when Soviet
appeared to engage in propaganda first to discredit Anglo-American
policies (e.g. in Balkans, China, Spain) and second to represent
the Soviet as the only power genuinely serving peace.

3. The disarmament proposals were probably produced in Assembly
partly to
challenge Britain and America, partly to maintain Soviet
reputation and possibly also to avoid the approaching crisis in
the Atomic Commission. Because several countries including United
Kingdom, United States of America, Australia and Canada were
prepared to meet the challenge, the situation was turned to good
account and the outcome was General Assembly resolution on
disarmament and approval by 10 votes of the Atomic report while
the Soviet had been led so far along the common path that Gromyko
abstained from voting against report. Nevertheless there is not
the least doubt that the Soviet still differs on one fundamental,
namely the place of the Security Council and hence veto in
implementation of disarmament and atomic controls and in spite of
what optimists say the Soviet clearly thinks about disarmament in
different terms to others, for example they see disarmament
primarily in terms of specific weapons such as atomic bomb rather
than in terms of total military strength. (They apparently place
Article 43 low on priority list and it is still uncertain exactly
what meaning they give to controls and safeguards.) [2]
Nevertheless they are in a position at the moment when they must
come along or denounce their public professions and our best line
would surely be to place the highest possible value on their
professions and act with confidence that Soviet intentions are
good until the Soviet itself gives any cause for doubt. Soviet
participation is essential.

4. [3] For example, when the Soviet proposed a Commission to
prepare plans, United States responded immediately with proposal
to give priority to Atomic Report. (Texts in our Security 213). I
submit that for the time being we should try to avoid repeating
December pattern of moves and counter-moves, while chances of
Security Council acceptance of Atomic Interim Report within the
next two or three weeks would appear better if the Council had
previously considered in good faith the Soviet proposal to set up
the Disarmament Commission. I submit that our broad objective
might be to bring about parallel work on the following lines-
A. Commission established by Security Council starts work
immediately on preparation of general disarmament plans.

B. Atomic Energy Commission proceeds with the next stage of the
work.

C. Military Staff Committee commences intensive work on Article
43.

It is clear progress in any one will depend on progress in the
others. Co-ordination will come through common representation.

5. A further difficulty arises from American personalities.

Senator Austin, who impresses me as being rather sententious and
who has hitherto spoken of disarmament as a worthy ideal rather
than a political and technical problem, shortly takes over
leadership of the United States Mission to United Nations. Baruch
[4] told me in strict confidence that his Atomic team will disband
largely because of the difficulty of fitting into the new regime
under Austin who will have strong authority. Nevertheless, Baruch
intends to be active backstage with Truman and Byrnes. His own
view of further progress is similar to that outlined in paragraph
4 above. There may, however, be brief period of American
indecision during which Australia might play an active role.

6. First decision will concern proposals now before Security
Council and I submit for your consideration that we should support
the Soviet proposal for immediate establishment of the Commission,
making clear that the Commission would work within full field of
Assembly resolution and not in any pre-selected part and that this
work will not prejudice in any way own province and continuance of
work of A.E.C. in its early consideration of Interim Atomic
Report. While Trieste may occupy the greater part or whole of the
Council Meeting on January 7th, your instructions are urgently
needed.