'I have now been in touch with both President Truman and Secretary
of State Marshall about the urgency of preliminaries for the
Japanese Treaty. I pointed out that the United States has a simple
duty to perform, namely, to call a preliminary conference of the
eleven or twelve powers concerned in fighting against Japan, and
at that conference to decide on a place for the meeting of the
final peace conference and also, where possible, on procedural
conditions including two thirds majority rule, which the United
States' State Department proposed in August last.

As you know, that was the unanimous view the British Commonwealth
group accepted at the Conference which met in Canberra under my
Chairmanship at the end of August.

Both President Truman and Mr. Marshall are still in agreement with
this in principle but some additional difficulty has been caused
by Chinese claim to exercise a veto which would not only be
intolerable in itself but would lead inevitably to the retention
of the veto by the United Nations. Despite general acceptance of
the views which you and I had, and which the British Commonwealth
group accepted in accordance with the United States' State
Department proposal, I think some positive step by yourself would
probably clinch any objection and perhaps you might consider
desirability of such action.'