I am forwarding to you the transcript of the Meetings of the
Advisory Committee on the Japanese Peace Settlement, together with
some comments.

I could not refrain from dealing with the big issues as affected
by the statements in this Committee and in the British
Commonwealth Conference as the short memorandum which I sent to
you before you left was inadequate.

I have been somewhat stirred up on this point because of the
nature of the reactions to the points raised which you put clearly
to the British Commonwealth Conference. There is a mood of
complacent acceptance which alarms me.

What angered me most was the reversal of opinion at the last
moment by the Defence Department. In my discussions with them and
in the Report of the Planning Committee, they advised a long
occupation of Japan. Then they came to the Conference led by that
redoubtable figure, General Robertson, and advised an immediate
evacuation. I tried to get the reason and two were suggested; one
by a member of the Defence Staff that at all costs we must keep
friendly with the Japanese Government. Can you beat it! Have they
a staff brain on the show? What is the friendship of Japan worth
if she is completely demilitarised? The other was that of General
Robertson who said that, if we did not evacuate on the signing of
the Peace, the Japanese people would become hostile and stab our
soldiers in the back. They have done this for several years and we
thought it our duty to resist them.

With these things in mind, I feel that I cannot do less than press
my point.