On Jap. Reparations, you tend to look at the matter objectively
and from the point of view of getting reparations-we are still
more preoccupied with the principle involved [in] the procedure.

Probably we have given up hope of much in the way of reparations
and don't attach much importance to means of physically extracting
them.

I cannot agree that, if the majority of F.E.C. wanted an early
peace conference, United States could object. I do agree regarding
the dangers of no continuing occupation force, but our firm
intention is to press for a continuation of controls. [1] Reports
we have received from Mac. Ball, indicating that the U.K.

Ambassador, MacArthur and the Japs have all agreed that there must
be a substantial Jap Force immediately after the Peace Settlement
to prevent infiltration from Korea and elsewhere, are extremely
disturbing. It is apparent there must be a force, but I cannot see
that Australia and New Zealand could agree to a Jap Force. If
there is no prospect of a continuation of Allied control, there is
some reason for not pressing for an early settlement, but our view
has been that there can be a settlement which would provide for
continuation of control.

Of course, our case is weakened by our obvious lack of enthusiasm
about maintaining control forces.

[matter omitted]

With regard to the tone of our 'blasts', I think you can assure
Mr. Fraser that this was just a spasm provoked by a set of
circumstances. [2] I was glad, in this connection, to receive your
comments on our draft to U.K. on the proposal for a British
Commonwealth meeting on Jap Settlement. I hope the final text was
to your liking. On that, if the U.K. pressed us, we would probably
accept London, but they will have to press us.