1. MacArthur talked to me for an hour this evening. On meeting him
he appeared rather cold. I asked him whether he had noticed the
press reports that you were in agreement with his views on the
need for an early peace conference for Japan. He said he had not
seen these reports but appeared very pleased to know that you were
supporting him. I then said that you had asked me to invite him to
give his personal view on when the peace conference could be held
and on the kind of control which should be exercised over Japan
after the peace treaty had been signed.

2.MacArthur then expounded what I described in my monthly report
for January as 'the doctrine of three phases'. He said that the
military phase of the occupation had not only succeeded physically
but spiritually. It had purged the minds of the Japanese of all
militarist ambitions. He said the success of the second phase, the
political, could not yet be finally measured because so much
depended on how the Japanese themselves would use their new
constitution.

3. 'All the same' MacArthur said, 'the success of these two first
phases has been fabulous, almost fantastic'.

4. MacArthur went on to say that the third stage, the economic,
presented much greater difficulties because it depended on the
willingness of allied Governments to do the right thing. Since the
economic measures necessary presented problems which were civilian
and not military and since he felt it would be essential to go
ahead with the third stage immediately he believed the peace
conference should be held as soon as possible.

5. I said 'Do you think it should be possible to have a peace
conference before the end of this year?' MacArthur replied 'That
seems to me a very pessimistic view. We must let these foreign
ministers get on with their work in Moscow but I shall be very
disappointed if the peace conference for Japan cannot be convoked
by July of this year.' MacArthur went on to say that he felt the
peace conference should be held in Tokyo. I remarked that
historically victor nations seemed to like to hold peace
conferences in their own countries. I said I had imagined that
this conference would be held in Washington or perhaps in San
Francisco. MacArthur replied that he did not mind where the peace
treaty was signed-it could be signed in Washington-but he felt
that the preliminary work and the real work of the people engaged
in the conference should be done in Tokyo.

6. MacArthur expressed the following views on the kind of controls
that it would be necessary to exercise after the conference. He
said he did not believe that a military occupation would be
necessary and so far as he personally was concerned he wanted to
get home once the peace treaty was signed. He felt the control of
Japan should be exercised within Japan by civilian experts who
would be able to inspect everything that was going on here.

Insofar as military control was necessary he felt that this should
be exercised from outside. He referred specifically to the
importance of an air base on Okinawa.

Part 2.

7. I asked MacArthur what he had in mind when in his recently
published message to the Senate he said that the present scale of
military occupation was the minimum consistent with safety. [3] He
had referred earlier in conversation to the danger of Russian
moves into Japan. Accordingly I asked him whether in stating that
it was necessary to maintain the present strength of military
occupation, he was not thinking more of Russian danger than
Japanese danger. He replied-'I was thinking of both'. He explained
that this was partly a psychological question. So long as Japan
was a military area, it was necessary to make a show. After the
peace treaty it would be possible to withdraw virtually all troops
from Japan proper. Moreover, when he had said that military forces
now in Japan were the minimum necessary he had not been thinking
specifically of B.C.O.F. forces. If British Commonwealth countries
felt it desirable to make some reduction in their forces here he
would certainly not protest.

8. I asked MacArthur what picture he had of the actual machinery
for controlling Japan after the peace treaty. He said that he felt
it should be United Nations controlled. I remarked that there were
a great many United Nations and that it would perhaps not be very
helpful to have South American or Balkan Governments represented
on the Control Commission for Japan. MacArthur said that he fully
agreed that the nations controlling Japan should be only those
nations which had played an active part in the Pacific war, but he
hoped that it would be possible for the United Nations to delegate
to some sort of Regional Commission the responsibility for the
control of Japan after the treaty.

9. MacArthur indicated that he would welcome the early demise of
the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council. At the same
time he felt that the Allied Council had done a good [deal of] [4]
useful work. Some of the recommendations of members had been most
valuable and questions raised on the Council had been a stimulus
to S.C.A.P. MacArthur reminded me that he had never tried to
conceal his view that it was a mistake to establish a Council. 'It
was a Gyp', he said. He went on to speak to the Council in what
seemed to all a very patronizing way. I said quietly that he had
made his attitude towards the Council very clear and that this had
often placed members of the Council in a very humiliating
position. I said I felt personally that if he himself had not
built up such a permanent reservoir of good will by all he had
done for Australia these last five years, it would have been very
difficult for any Australian to have put up with the contemptuous
way in which S.C.A.P. had so often treated the Council. At this
MacArthur laughed in a friendly way and said he was sorry, if his
men had sometimes been a bit tough with the Council but the fact
was he distrusted Derevyanko. MacArthur said that if I knew the
full story of all the trouble Derevyanko had caused in Japan I
would understand better the firm and perhaps sometimes rather
rough line that his representatives had taken on the Council. I
replied that I was not wanting to express any sort of bitterness
or resentment for what had happened here in the past and I felt
the important thing was to forget past Council irritations in
order that we could co-operate in the closest way in our work on
the peace settlement.

10. MacArthur then said that during his time in the Pacific he had
never had any kind of political differences with the Australian
Government; that he deplored the view that because a country had
only seven million people it was a small power; that in the
Pacific Australia with New Zealand was a very important power;

that he fully agreed with your view that Australia should take a
principal part in the Pacific settlement; that he was sorry you
had not come to Japan; that whenever you wish to express your
views to him or to discover his views he was extremely happy to
consult you in the spirit of comradeship that had characterised
the American-Australian effort throughout the war.

11. MacArthur said he felt that no country in the world in
relation to its resources had played a finer or more gallant part
than Australia and he looked for-ward to the closest collaboration
with Australia in planning the treaty with Japan.

12. MacArthur emphasised throughout that he was talking to me
informally and expressing his personal views.