November meetings of Deputies and Council of Foreign Ministers.

You may wish to take steps to counter the somewhat defeatist
attitude apparent in Washington. Point might be made that it is
premature and dangerous to assume that game is lost before it is
played; moreover, while it may be expected that Russian tactics
will be obstructive, way to negotiation is still open and at this
stage little or nothing will be gained by impatience. Bevin and
Bidault are anxious that conference should not fail if only for
domestic reasons, although French view is less optimistic than
that of the United Kingdom. Following is summary of information to
hand:

2. Reports from Washington and Paris on the one hand and London on
the other indicate divergent views as to the prospects of
successful outcome of Council of Foreign Ministers. In Washington
Hickerson has told Stirling that he believed the chances of
success were slander, although agreement on Austria was just
possible. He referred to the possibility of a complete breakdown
which would mean the end or at best indefinite adjournment of the
CFM. In Paris Blakeney [2] has seen Minister directing European
Affairs named Paris and reports that the latter is also very
pessimistic both as to the Deputies and the Council itself,
although he mentioned a 'hint that may mean that the Soviet may
prove more amenable'. Paris added that the French will go to
London with an open mind. Indications are that French recognise
the necessity, in the event of a breakdown, of reviewing many
present plans. This may be taken to mean that the French will be
prepared to cooperate more widely with the United Kingdom and
United States.

3. London reports indicate that Bevin and advisers have a more
optimistic approach. Bevin told Beasley that if United States aid
to Europe became a reality by the time CFM meets, he thought that
Molotov will recognise facts. otherwise he thinks he may continue
to delay in hope of further economic collapse in Europe. United
Kingdom officials are working on documents and Heydon reports that
general views remain as at Moscow conference.

4. Understand Deputies' agenda will be limited to (a) procedure,
(b) provisional political organisation in Germany and other
matters of relatively less importance, and that issues such as
economic unity and reparations will not be raised until meeting of
CFM. It appears likely that both the French and United Kingdom,
because they will not wish to be thought obstructive, will be
hesitant in supporting fully democratic procedures such as we have
previously proposed. in fact the United Kingdom officials are
still thinking on lines of associating other belligerents through
system of committees which will leave CFM in virtually same
predominant position as at Paris. Beasley will press the proposals
stated in your personal messages to Marshall and Bevin of April
last.

5. With regard to procedure, you may think it advisable that
rather than rely on the United Kingdom or United States to press
our proposals, we should press them independently. You yourself
will be in London at the time of the CFM meeting but it may be
that useful purpose would be served if you approached Vyshinsky
while in New York and put to him frankly the view that the only
way to tackle the German problem is on the basis of principle, and
that if the minor belligerent nations were given their just rights
in participating in the peace settlement, there would be greater
likelihood of all participants approaching the problem with the
idea of obtaining a just solution and, incidentally, a more
objective recognition of the Soviet Union's own claims in regard
to the Settlement. Such an approach would at least give us a check
on Bevin's reports of unfavourable Soviet reactions to proposal
for wider participation.