Please convey the following personal message to MARSHALL from the
Minister. Begins.

While I appreciate your great efforts for wider participation by
the middle and smaller nations in the German peace negotiations,
there are certain fundamental aspects of the settlement to which I
feel it my duty to call your attention.

It would appear from the proposals which both the United States
and United Kingdom delegations have put forward for procedure that
there has been a misinterpretation of the special responsibilities
of the four powers in regard to the German Settlement. Australia
always loyally accepted the leadership of the great powers in time
of war, and I have often stated that there were important respects
in which that leadership would also be loyally accepted in the
post-war years. Nevertheless it has never been my understanding
that the four powers would carry their insistence on leadership so
far as to take upon themselves the final responsibility for making
the peace. This was never intended in the Potsdam Agreement. May I
respectfully remind you of the statement made by Mr Byrnes on this
point in a broadcast of 5th October.

'At Berlin, it certainly was never intended that the three powers
present or the five powers constituting the Council should take
unto themselves the making of the final peace. The Berlin
declaration setting up the council begins with the statement-"The
Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment
of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory
work for the peace settlement.' The Council was not to make the
peace settlement but to do the necessary preparatory work for the
peace settlement.'
It is clear, therefore, that any special responsibilities which
the four powers may have in regard to the peace settlement refer
only to preparation. As you know, we have never accepted as either
just or democratic the subsequent procedure laid down for the
peace treaties with Italy and the satellite enemies at the
Conference of the Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December, 1945.

This was based on a misinterpretation of Potsdam and its failure
was fully proved by the experience of the Paris Conference when it
was found that a prior agreement by the members of the Council of
Foreign Ministers not to accept any amendment to a proposal on
which they had previously reached agreement made it impossible for
many constructive proposals and amendments to be accepted. It was
further proved by the manner in which many of the recommendations
of the Paris Conference were altered or rejected by the Council of
Foreign Ministers when drawing up the final texts of the treaties.

The need to improve on the methods adopted at Paris has been
admitted by all four powers, notably at the deputies' meetings in
London last January and February. But the improvements now under
consideration in Moscow appear to me to perpetuate the
misinterpretation of the true functions of the Council of Foreign
Ministers as a preparatory body only. At its best, the procedure
under consideration treats the middle and smaller active
belligerents as [if they] were subordinates or consultants, a very
different role to that which they were repeatedly led to expect
when their assistance in the war was required. Moreover the peace
conference with Germany is still only to be permitted to make
recommendations which the Council of Foreign Ministers is to be
free to amend or reject at will.

In view of this I should like to make the following positive
suggestions:

i. The United Kingdom and the United States should endeavour to
depart from the pattern which the Council of Foreign Ministers
meetings have taken, namely preliminary assertions on principle
that there will be firmness about rights of active belligerents to
participate in peace making but ultimate compromise due to the
fact that Russia, largely supported by France, does everything
possible to prevent such participation. I am convinced that if
Russia was firmly told the procedure which had to be adopted (see
para. ii, iii, & iv below) she would ultimately yield. The pattern
tends to perpetuate itself because the Russians rely upon
representatives of other countries yielding to the pressure of
fatigue and particularly to the fear of so-called unsuccessful
conference. A compromise reached under such circumstances involves
sacrifices of the rights of other belligerents.

ii. The fundamental necessity is an attempt to call an unfettered
conference of active belligerents and allow that body to assume
final responsibility for the peace settlement. If that were agreed
on, the conference could itself give authority to an executive
consisting of the major powers and other selected countries to
take charge of the preparatory and drafting work. A suitable
occasion for the calling of the first meeting of such a conference
might be the next meeting of the General Assembly. Having
appointed its executive and the necessary committees which would
remain in continuous session, the conference could adjourn and
then meet again as required.

iii. The Paris conference was largely prejudiced by prior
recommendations of the Council of Foreign Ministers in regard to
voting procedure. This in turn led to a long struggle at Paris
over voting. But voting procedure could be excluded altogether
from consideration at a peace conference, because ex hypothesis a
peace settlement when made requires unanimity. Unanimity, however,
should not be reached at Council of Foreign Ministers level prior
to the conference but at the conference itself. In my view there
is a danger that the latest United States proposals on voting will
merely reproduce the friction and misunderstanding of the Paris
Conference.

iv. It is absolutely essential that there should be no agreement
amongst the Council of Foreign Ministers that they will adhere to
the terms of any draft unless any agree to an alteration. The fact
is that no treaty in relation to Germany will be enduring if it is
brought about by exclusive and undemocratic methods such as
implied at the Paris Conference and which are in danger of being
perpetuated in the latest proposals on procedure.

Ends.

A similar message is being sent to the Secretary of State for the
Dominions. [1] You should inform Bevin of the above message
immediately as well as your other Dominions colleagues. As this is
a matter of great importance to Australia we would like you to be
more active than you have been in impressing our point of view.

You will recall that we previously gave you authority, and indeed
instructions, to initiate discussions. It is useless merely to act
as an emissary on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation.

With reference to your 124, you should be aware that none of the
proposals referred to in para IO is acceptable. [2] The reasons
for this will be quite clear from the Minister's message to
Marshall.