1. The following are some comments on broader tactics, looking
ahead a bit to Australia's position in world affairs, which may be
useful to you:-

2. Reference Marshall's speech. [1] You will recall that, when
Watt saw Vyshinski we based our attitude on the Balkans Commission
report which found at least some fault on both sides. It would
seem to me that, if we were to support the United States 'finding
of responsibility' unreservedly, we would lay ourselves open to an
accusation of bad faith which might, in the future, close the door
to Australia's effective participation in any future situation in
which we might be able to help breach of gap between the great
powers. In spite of the tremendous provocation at this present
time, it would seem to me a great pity for you personally not to
leave yourself in a position from which, at the appropriate time,
you might be able to breach this ever-widening gap. I have not yet
dismissed the possibility contemplated a year ago of a visit by
you, under favourable circumstances, to Moscow. The possibility on
the Greek issue is that you could join with the United States,
provided they undertook that the form of economic assistance by
them to Greece and to other countries in the future should not be
the sale of munitions of war. A move along these lines would, I
think be most acceptable here and appeal to other countries as
being the effective compromise.

3. Marshall's approach on conventional armaments is identical with
the United Kingdom which we previously opposed and identical with
attempts twenty years ago, i.e. no steps can be taken until
conditions of confidence prevail. Understand that neither United
States nor United Kingdom wish to agree to any reduction in
armaments regardless of what Soviet might do and that they merely
wish to keep talks alive without coming to any conclusions. Way
may be open for United Kingdom, because of financial and manpower
reasons, without giving that reason, to make a gesture of
reduction on the basis that someone must be prepared to start
before confidence can be restored. While United States and United
Kingdom fears are understandable, their attitude seems to be one
of utter despair'
4. Marshall's proposal for Committee as means of avoiding veto
would seem to me to play into your hands to regain initiative. [2]
He is just side-stepping issue in an unpractical way, whereas your
approach has been more direct and designed to obtain limitation of
veto by agreement. You will recall that, after the last Assembly,
when we raised this matter, the veto was sparingly used. This was
the result of free expression of public opinion, and the same
method seems to be more effective than a decision by a majority
vote which will not be observed. The truth of the matter is the
veto supported by America and all other Great Powers was wrong in
principle, as you stated at San Francisco, and that, far from
bringing unanimity, it has tended to destroy it. Attempts to
abolish it now must be frustrated by its further use and therefore
cause further disunity. The French veto in the Indonesian case
indicates that other powers will use it if vital interests are
touched, and the next move might easily be for the Soviet to raise
issues which would force a United States veto.

United States cannot always assume that she will have with her a
majority. It would seem from here that your original line adopted
last Assembly is the better procedure and one which at the
appropriate time you might be able, with good effect, to introduce
after the United States resolution has given an opportunity to
test fully the general opinion.