Reference my telegram of March 4th, probable programme for
Commission is as follows. Until 12th March main body of Commission
will continue to hear principal witnesses at Salonika. After 12th
March witnesses may be heard at discretion of Commission by a
small body remaining in Salonika. From 9th to 20th March an
investigation team under the leadership of the Australian
representative will visit Albanian frontier region and Yugoslav
frontier region in neighbourhood of Florina. From 13th to 19th
March another team will visit Yugoslav frontier area accessible
from Salonika. Proposed terminal date for enquiry in Greece is
about 22nd March. Chief delegates may then visit Sofia and
Belgrade, proceeding to Switzerland for preparation of report.

2. Party which has been visiting islands and Central Greece
collected practically no evidence bearing directly on frontier
problems but received much political propaganda on the one hand
from refugees from the northern Balkan countries now living in the
islands and on the other from Communists exiled on the Island of
Ikaria, guerilla groups and guerilla-controlled villages. One
witness seen was Andreas Tzimas, former Communist Deputy who was
E.L.A.S. [2] Liaison Officer to Tito. It is possible he may be
summoned to Salonika to give evidence respecting his activities in
Yugoslavia, which have been frequently referred to by witnesses
heard here. The general trend of the evidence heard by this party
from witnesses was to the effect that the disturbances in Greece
and on the frontier were due solely to the alleged persecution by
the present Government of all left wing elements, and that the
bandits operating in Central Greece had not been armed by the
Northern Balkan powers but were only using arms from the E.L.A.S.

Army, or those taken by force from the Greek Army and Gendarmerie.

Allegations of persecution by the right wing were also made by
witnesses heard at Agoriani, which is in a bandit-controlled area.

To E.A.M. adherents in this area the present conflict seemed one
entirely of Greek 'Democracy' against the 'Fascist' Government of
Athens, and no knowledge was admitted of intervention from
outside.

3. On the other hand, the witnesses presented by the Greek
Government who are now being heard at Salonika, all of whom so far
have been former members of bands who either surrendered or were
captured, have been specific as regards details of active support
given to bandits from across the frontiers, and for the most part
have not been shaken under exhaustive cross examination from the
Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Albanian and (to a less extent) the Soviet
representatives. There is no doubt that their evidence is building
up a picture of, at the least, deliberate connivance of the
northern countries at the warfare in Greece, including military
training (particularly in Yugoslavia), facilities for crossing the
frontiers, supply of arms and equipment, and care of wounded. One
central fact which is emerging is the activity of the so-called
People's Liberation Front (N.O.F.) in Yugoslavia, which appears in
reality to be a movement for the incorporation of Greek Macedonia
into Yugoslav Macedonia, and which all through last year was
indoctrinating Greek bandits in the north with the idea of
Macedonian 'liberation' from Greece.

4. In this connection it is likely that the Yugoslavs, in their
anxiety to grind an axe for themselves, have exceeded the limits
of the encouragement which they received from Moscow in the early
stages of the intervention in Greece. The Soviet Representative of
the Commission has been visibly embarrassed at the disclosures of
the activities of N.O.F. It obviously does not suit Soviet policy
to be implicitly associated with a movement of which the object is
an avowed annexation of territory.

5. It is now possible to see the main lines of the report which
would be drafted by the majority of the Commission. It would
include the clear deduction from the evidence that the frontier
disturbances have been in the last 12 months aided and abetted by
the northern Balkan states, that at least two of these, Yugoslavia
and Bulgaria, have attempted to make use of Greek internal
instability to provoke expansionist aims at the expense of Greek
territory, and that behind the whole range of these more or less
related activities lies the idea, not openly put forward by
Governments but certainly developed at many lower levels, of the
incorporation of Greece in the Communist-controlled Balkans Bloc.

The majority opinion would also be that Greece itself was very far
from faultless, that there is some substance in the allegations of
a state of civil war in Greece, and that a great many of the 20 or
30,000 Greeks who comprise the bandit forces are genuinely
resisting what they believe to be an authoritarian, antidemocratic
rule.

6. While this would be the broad judgment of the majority of the
Commission on the facts as they have been seen on the spot, there
is also a strong feeling that the Commission should go to the
limit of its authorised powers in making recommendations for the
future. The Greek Foreign Office itself, through its Liaison
Officer with the Commission, has indicated to the United States
and Australian representatives its hope that the Commission, while
making for the sake of the record a clear condemnation of the acts
of intervention from the north, will proceed further and suggest
means for putting a stop to the present situation. An acceptable
arrangement to the Greeks would be a non-aggression pact between
the four Balkan countries in similar terms to the pacts concluded
between the Soviet Union and the Little Entente in 1933. These
earlier treaties contain a detailed definition of aggression
(identical with that discussed at San Francisco) which covers
fairly exactly the contingencies now present along the Greek
frontier. Before the Greek Foreign Office made these views known
the same idea had been canvassed by the United States delegation,
and it would probably be acceptable to the majority of the
Commission. There would naturally have to be adaptations from the
model treaty of 1933 and especially it would be essential to
provide for a standing Supervisory Commission under the United
Nations, to be composed either of the four states themselves or
the four states plus certain other members of the United Nations.

If you have any comments on this proposal I would be glad to
receive them in good time before preparation of the report.

7. The Greek view is that if the Commission does this much it will
fully justify itself and that the United Nations can thereafter
safely leave Greece to work out its own salvation. This,
unfortunately, is not true. Recent decisions of the Athens
Government, a new wave of arrests of left wing adherents, and the
appointment as Minister of Public Order of the notorious General
Zervas predict an all out attempt to crush the guerrilla bands and
E.A.M., which will risk precipitating a real civil war, unless
some restraints are imposed. Without such restraints it could
easily happen that within a few weeks a new situation will have
arisen in Greece which will make the Commission's report out of
date before it can be discussed in the Security Council.

8. The Athens Government, urged on by the Royalist and
Conservative Press, relies on its belief that whatever
difficulties it gets into the United Kingdom and United States of
America must in the last resort always support it in order to
prevent Greece from falling into the Eastern European Communist
Bloc.

9. I have met most of the Members of the Cabinet and am not much
impressed by their competence or breadth of outlook. Left to
itself the Government is unlikely to do much to stop either the
trend towards political extremism in the country or the present
disastrous economic drift. British missions are well regarded but
they remain purely advisors and on the whole the British seem to
have found no way of imposing reasonable efficiency in the
administration or practical steps towards political
reconciliation. The King apparently takes no effective part in the
direction of policy.

10. There is now every indication of much more active interest by
the United States of America in Greek affairs than has been the
case hitherto. Reports sent back to the State Department by the
American delegate on the Commission have stressed the
unsatisfactory internal conditions in Greece, and the report of
the United States Economic Mission which has just finished its
enquiry here will also contain severest criticism of the
incompetent and shortsighted economic policy of the Government. As
a result of these reports I understand that any financial help
which the United States will give to Greece either directly or
indirectly by way of assisting the British in their commitments
will be linked with some strict conditions. The principal
condition may be insistence on new elections at the latest by the
autumn, to be prepared and held in a manner which will ensure the
participation this time of all the left wing parties. Whether
anything can be done meanwhile to broaden the composition of the
Government is doubtful. Difficulties between certain personalities
seem irreconcilable and in any case there is a noted lack of good
party leaders. However, an assurance of new elections, if it can
be got, will encourage moderate elements in the Government and
will go a long way towards meeting the more legitimate demands of
the extreme left, which believes, rightly or wrongly, that the
ruling groups in Athens intend to exclude the left wing parties
from sharing in the Government indefinitely, and tends, therefore
more and more towards extreme courses.

11. I have formed the opinion myself that in these circumstances
lies the best chance of the United Nations Commission to help to
bring about some positive improvement in the political situation
in this area.