Cablegram 277 LONDON, 27 December 1947, 4.20 p.m.
IMMEDIATE SECRET PERSONAL
Thank you for your message in your telegram No- 347 about
Palestine. May I say first how much we valued the co-operation
between our Delegations in New York.
2. I am sorry if you formed the impression from the statements
made by Cadogan and Martin during the New York discussions that we
favoured the gradual assumption of functions in Palestine by
United Nations Commission. There was admittedly a period during
the discussions in the Sub-Committee when we were examining the
possibility of a progressive transfer of responsibilities but our
conception of 'progressive' was geographical and not functional.
We came to the conclusion, however, that even this form of
piecemeal transfer was impossible so long as the United Kingdom
was responsible as Mandatory for the Government of Palestine. We
consequently instructed Cadogan to make it clear that so long as
we continued to hold the Mandate for Palestine we must insist on
undivided control of the country. When the first report of Sub-
Committee One was being examined by the Ad Hoc Committee on 20th
November Cadogan stated our attitude on this point and it was in
the light of this statement that the Sub-Committee revised their
report. Martin re-emphasized this point on the 22nd November when
he said:
'The authority of the Mandatory Power continues unimpaired until
the Mandate is terminated and then it is reduced stage by stage
applying only to a limited extent in those areas under military
occupation.'
'Progressive transfer in the sense in which it is used in these
Articles (B2 and
B13) would, in our view, begin after termination of the Mandate.'
3. Our position in this matter was fully explained by the Colonial
Secretary in the House of Commons on 11th December. He made the
following points:
(a) The Mandatory responsibility for Government in Palestine must
be relinquished as a whole on an appointed day;
(b) This day has been provisionally fixed for 15th May, by which
time our military withdrawal will make it impossible to retain
full Mandatory responsibility;
(c) For reasons of administrative efficiency responsibility and
security there should only be a brief overlap between the arrival
of the United Nations Mission and the termination of the Mandate;
(d) Meanwhile there is much that the Mission can do outside
Palestine to make arrangements for the assumption of its
responsibilities.
4. When we expressed to Arab Governments the hope that they would
not make trouble while we were still in charge we certainly did
not intend to encourage them to make trouble when we withdrew and
we shall of course continue to use our influence to persuade them
to act with restraint when our responsibility ends. At the same
time we must bear in mind when making representations to them the
importance both to the United Kingdom and to the Commonwealth
generally of good relations with the Arab world.
5. I can assure you that as soon as the United Nations have set up
the Commission we shall negotiate with it with a view to reaching
some mutually satisfactory arrangement for the transfer of power.
We have no desire to impede the work of the Commission but we feel
that it is in their interest as much as in ours that they should
be fully seized of the problems ahead of them before they assume
responsibility in Palestine where their arrival is bound to
provoke reactions which they must be prepared to meet. We are
forming a team of negotiators to proceed to New York for this
purpose early in January.
[AA : A1838, TS852/20/2, ii]