Assembly 176.

1. The Palestine ad hoc Committee made considerable progress
yesterday in debate on reports of two Sub-Committees referred to
in my UN.1150 Assembly 173 and preceding telegrams. A report of
Sub-Committee One was submitted with certain changes to bring
proposals into conformity with United Kingdom declaration of
November 20 in particular the desire of the Mandatory Power not to
hand over authority direct either to Jews or Arabs but only to the
proposed United Nations Commission and also to decide for itself
the date of termination of Mandate and withdrawal of troops and
for that purpose to retain all necessary measures to protect the
lines of communication and ensure the safety of troops in the
areas under Military Occupation.

2. On the whole the United Kingdom wishes on these and related
points have been substantially met in the plan of Sub-Committee
One. Naturally the United Kingdom would have preferred the
presence in Palestine of United Nations Military Force to enforce
a settlement but it has been obvious from the beginning that this
is out of the question. However it is pointed out that the absence
of military means to enforce any positive plan applies equally to
the proposals of both Sub-Committees.

3. There are now three alternative courses before the Assembly-
(A) Proposals of Sub-Committee number One. These are substantially
the recommendations of the majority of UNSCOP as elaborated by a
Sub-Committee of nine which now unanimously supports them,
including the United States, U.S.S.R. and Canada. An important
feature of the plan is that it contains safeguards in respect of
Jerusalem, guaranteeing international control and full protection
of holy places. It contains also safeguards for protection of
Christian interests generally in both Jewish and Arab States.

(B) The proposals of Sub-Committee Two. These imply control of the
whole of Palestine by the Arabs with the consequence among others
that Jewish immigration will be immediately eliminated. The plan
provides for no implementation in the sense of enforcement any
more than does plan number one. From the point of view of the
United Nations the plan departs considerably from that of Sub-
Committee One in that it makes no provision at all for United
Nations supervision in the process of setting up self-governing
institutions.

(C) The refusal or inability of the Assembly to offer any solution
at all, either because of the rejection of both plans or failure
to support one by a majority of less than two thirds. [1]

4. Of all three alternatives the third is the worst as it would
say in effect to Jews and Arabs 'British Forces are leaving
Palestine. The United Nations, although responsible for
international peace and security and although the United Kingdom
Government has asked for its recommendations offers no solution
and you must fight the matter out.' This third result is quite
likely to be brought about by abstentions in the final vote. New
Zealand among others has announced the possibility of abstaining
but arguments used by this group are open to criticism on the
ground that while emphasising the absence of enforcement
provisions in the plan of Sub-Committee One (which in any case New
Zealand supports in principle) they overlook the corresponding
absence of such provision in the Arab plan which as a result of a
deficient vote in the Assembly would thus lead to violence and
disorder. Under Sub-Committee One plan as amended the proposed
Commission will receive its functions from the Assembly and carry
them out according to the recommendations of the Assembly while
being also under the general supervision of the Security Council.

In other words both Assembly and Security Council jurisdictions
are exercisable. There has been some legal argument about the
extent of the Assembly's powers in entrusting functions of the
kind proposed to the Commission but it is pointed out that the
case of the Korean Commission is somewhat analogous. In any event
the Assembly will almost certainly refuse to follow the Arab
resolution for reference of certain questions to the International
Court especially as most of them are not legal questions at all
but questions of a political and historical nature.

5. In all the circumstances a course of abstention in the vote is
the worst to follow as it would tend to lead to a situation of
abdicated responsibility on the part of United Nations. The plan
of Sub-Committee Two was emphatically rejected by UNSCOP and has
no chance of acceptance. As regards plan One the UNSCOP majority
never regarded this as a plan for partition pure and simple and it
has been emphasised again here that the plan provides as a[n]
essential and indispensable part for arrangements for Economic
Union. These imply a scheme for Quasi-Federation in which
substantial administrative and legislative powers are lodged in
the Central Economic Board which would have exclusive authority
over Customs, Currency, Communications and allocation of Revenues.

On the other hand the scheme would set up separate political units
with autonomous powers in the fields of Foreign Relations, Defence
and Immigration. The whole arrangement thus set up could gradually
lead to a close interlocking of the two States and could even
compel in due course developments trending towards Federalism.

6. In view of these reasons and the situation in the ad hoc
Committee, which has been the most difficult Committee of the
Assembly, and in the handling of which the Minister has repeatedly
had to take the initiative, it is practically impossible for the
Minister to avoid taking part in the vote, which could come very
quickly, and supporting the plan of partition plus Economic Union
as it seems to offer the best of difficult alternatives in the
circumstances existing. It must be added however that it appears
doubtful whether two thirds majority will be obtained in the
plenary session.