INDONESIA

My telegrams 88 and 89. [1] I discussed the situation this morning
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Van Vredenburch, the
Political Director. I found him very pessimistic and very much on
the defensive. He emphasized that the Indonesian reply was evasive
and an attempt to secure further concessions, that further
discussions were useless and that the only possible alternative
was the use of 'limited' force. He said that there would be no
decision until the report of the Commission-General was received
within the next day or so.

2. I urged that his views were too pessimistic and defeatist. The
Indonesian reply was a document drafted by orientals who could not
give way or they lost face and should be judged as such. If it was
lengthy and legalistic it was no more so than the Dutch note. On
many points the divergence of the view was not too wide and now
there should be, as quickly as possible, discussions round a table
in an attempt to find an agreed course of action. Finally there
could never be 'limited' use of force. Once it was used it would
be absolute and would be condemned in the United Kingdom, United
States and Australia where the Netherlands would forfeit all
sympathy.

3. Van Vredenburch took my comments with good grace but repeated
that it would be useless to have further discussions. He gave me
the impression of a man whose advice had been disregarded and who
knew of a decision of which he disapproved.