Historical documents
Cablegram K32 BATAVIA, 30 December 1947, 5.50 p.m.
SECRET
On Saturday night the Committee met the Dutch ministers (Beel,
Drees, Jonkman and Neher), Van Mook, Vredenburch and Abdulkadir. I
shall forward as soon as possible a comprehensive summary of the
attitude of the ministers. [2] In brief the Netherlands want the
world to know through the Committee that it is committed to the
following policy on Indonesia.
(a) Indonesia will have full sovereignty based on the
establishment of a United States of Indonesia which will be a
member of the United Nations [3] and have equal status with the
Netherlands.
(b) Policy will continue to be in accordance with Linggadjati,
United States of Indonesia and Netherlands will be equal partners
united in a union.
(c) Indonesian peoples will have self determination according to
the principles of the United Nations.
(d) The United States of Indonesia will consist of a number of
Negaras of equal
status, the number being determined according to the wishes of the
people.
(e) Sovereignty will belong to the federation and not the
individual Negaras, therefore, there will be no foreign
representation for Negaras, only for the United States of
Indonesia.
(f) Consequently the Republic will have to give up aspirations to
independent sovereignty as such and co-operate in the formation of
the United States of Indonesia.
(g) The Republicans will not only participate in the
administration of the Negaras but also in the United States of
Indonesia. (The Dutch Prime Minister announced the [4] intention
of using moderate elements in the Republic.)
(h) Present movements towards organisation of political units are
spontaneous.
(i) The Netherlands are obliged to hurry and much stress is placed
on the vital importance of speed. They are being pushed by the
peoples of Indonesia, East Sumatra, Borneo etc. to form the United
States of Indonesia.
(j) The Netherlands will be responsible for Government over the
intermediate period.
(k) It is intended to transfer authority to an interim federal
government formed by Indonesians and including Republican leaders.
2. In answer to a query they all made it clear, on the prompting
of Van Vredenburch and Van Mook, that an effective truce and
restoration of law and order must precede a political agreement.
All three members of the Committee stressed that military and
political proposals must be regarded as part of an integrated
approach.
3. The Netherlands also presented a long paper on the latest plan.
[5] The principal objections are to-
(a) The exception of West Java in paragraph 2 of annex 1. [6]
(b) The proposal for an immediate stand fast on present positions
in this area.
(c) The attachment [of] annex 2 on political considerations. [7]
They say 'as an agreement with the principles of the solution
offered in these suggestions seems impossible, the annex should be
withdrawn and memoranda requested of both parties should be taken
as a starting point for political discussions'.
(d) The publication of annex 2 in its present form on the argument
that 'the fear and unrest created by the policy of coercion [by]
the Republic would be greatly increased if points 2 and 3 were put
forward at this stage as essential to the attainment of a just and
lasting settlement'.
4. The Netherlands delegation agree to paragraphs three, four, six
and seven of annex one and there is also agreement with sections
of other paragraphs such as paragraph five, annex one. These could
probably be extended in consultation.
5. In general it may be concluded that the Netherlands would
accept the truce proposals on basis of the Van Mook line but will
not withdraw her forces and will not accept the political
principles suggested by the Committee.
6. The Republic will probably accept the Committee's plan today or
tomorrow but will make most of the points set out in paragraph
three of my telegram K.31. [8] All elements in the Government and
parties are behind this acceptance including the Masjoemi.
7. The Committee arranged for Sjarifoeddin to have a private
conversation with Beel yesterday. However, Sjarifoeddin has been
obliged to remain in Djokjakarta to clean up a small
conspiratorial element in the community, police force and army
which is spreading propaganda that he is pro-Dutch. The Republic
suspects that this element is Dutch inspired. Sjarifoeddin's stay
at Djokjakarta has been explained by sickness which is at least
partly true. Setiadjit saw Beel in his place and received little
beyond an appeal that the Republic must accept truce and co-
operate with the Netherlands in the next few days.
8. There are rumours that a further police action is contemplated
on 2nd January. As far as I can gather this is an old plan of the
Dutch and I hope does not take full account of recent
developments. Certainly the Committee's presence in Indonesia must
be an important brake.
9. My immediate objectives are-
(a) To get a report to the Security Council as early as possible
with paragraph 5(e) of my telegram K.26 [9] in mind. This
procedure depends on American support and Graham and Van Zeeland
are still hanging back.
(b) Publication of latest plan and response of parties as soon as
possible. Graham's support seems assured.
(c) Full exploration immediately of Netherlands position to see
how far we can get them to accept the Committee's plan.
10. With regard to (c) the Committee agreed today-
(a) To prepare a paper by tomorrow morning seeking a
reconciliation between the
Netherlands proposals for a political settlement and the
Committee's own principles. This does not imply any withdrawal of
the Committee's plan on which it is agreed we stand firm. But
although the Netherlands in their reply rejected annex 2 their
comments on individual principles offer scope for compromise and
clarification. This clarification will be necessary whether the
Netherlands are acting in good faith [10] or not. Moreover, I am
hoping that a carefully prepared paper will strengthen the
Committee's position and make a Dutch refusal difficult.
(b) That the Committee should endeavour to see the Netherlands
ministers again before their departure and if possible after
consideration of the Republic's reply.
[AA:A1838/274, 854/10/4/2, iii]