Thanks for your telegram I.10. [1] I passed on the message in the
last paragraph to Sjarifoeddin who was pleased to get it.

2. After vigorous debates in Committee it was agreed that we
should endeavour to prepare a paper which would incorporate and
compromise the views of individual members. This paper has now
been prepared as a message to the parties on the following lines-
(1) A serious and strong reminder relative to the responsibility
of the Committee of Good Offices and parties concerned; the latter
have, and must keep, the primary responsibility both for decisions
and failure to take decisions.

(2) The Committee's solemn warning to the parties reminding them
of the spirit and letter of the resolution of the Security Council
[2], emphasizing the danger of long delay.

(3) Recommendation to the parties:

(a) To sign immediately and implement the points contained in our
documents relating to immediate cessation of hostilities. (b) To
sign within a few days and implement immediately a truce agreement
combining documents prepared and before the Committee and
suggestions set out in Annex 1 attached.

(4) The suggestion that once these measures are taken both parties
approach substantive discussions in a new spirit of immediate
cooperation, both stating clearly and immediately in most moderate
forms their present views concerning a possible settlement of
political dispute in Indonesia with particular reference to
elaborating the following principles of Linggadjati:

(a) Independence of Indonesian people.

(b) Cooperation between peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

(c) A federal sovereign state under constitution to be arrived at
by democratic process.

(d) A union between the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands.

(5) Suggestion in Annex 2 of a programme of principles which the
Committee believe should be included in a just and lasting
settlement.

3. The suggestions of Annex 1 and Annex 2 are particularly
important and are set out in my telegrams K.29 and K.30. [3]

4. I believe that it will be possible to reach unanimity in the
Committee on this paper. My agreement would be based on the
following:.

(1) At this stage of the crisis a division in the Committee would
give the Dutch an opportunity of winning out by delays both in the
Council and in Indonesia. A united and firm stand by the Committee
particularly when one of the members has international prestige of
Van Zeeland should have a very great effect on the Dutch, world
opinion and the Security Council.

(2) The proposals which we are now drafting are much stronger than
I would have thought possible with retention of unanimity.

Concessions made by Van Zeeland are very great indeed.

(3) Admittedly the general acceptance of the Van Mook line is a
handful to take but it does not go to the limit authorised in your
telegram I.10. The exceptions in paragraph 2 of Annex 1 cover the
more important areas to the Republic. Moreover, it seems but a
temporary truce based on positions now and, supported by a strong
statement of principles, appears the best opportunity for the
Dutch withdrawals.

(4) I have discussed the proposals with Sjarifoeddin who has
raised no objections.

(5) I do not believe for one moment that the Netherlands will
accept our proposals. If we can go to Security Council with
unanimous reasonable proposals turned down by one side only, our
position will be as strong as we can make it and provide every
opportunity for our representative making appropriate
recommendations which will empower the Committee to enforce a
truce.

(6) I have Graham's concurrence that the paper should be
publicised as early as possible and this will mean that the
Republic will gain the best possible advantage from the strong
statement of principles in our Annex 2. Such a statement will
obviously increase Dutch political difficulties in the Islands.

5. The proposal is to submit our suggestions informally to the
parties in the first instance and seek their early agreement. In
the case of the Netherlands we would also endeavour to discuss the
matter informally with the visiting Ministers including the Prime
Minister, Beel. I believe that the Republican Cabinet will
consider the suggestions on Saturday.

6. My efforts to speed the report to the Security Council have
achieved:

(1) Release to the press on Tuesday evening of the text of the
truce plan and the text of the memoranda submitted to the
Committee by Special Committees of the parties expressing their
viewpoints on the plan;

(2) Preparation of full and factual draft interim report which
will be considered by the Committee tomorrow or the next day. I
have been unsuccessful, however, in ensuring the cabling of a
summary of the report to the Security Council. The other members
of the Committee are reluctant and developments outlined in this
telegram have affected the position. I shall, of course, continue
to endeavour to have a summary cabled on Friday. Since the truce
plan of the Committee and the replies of the two parties have been
published this may at least partly meet our requirements.

7. I have talked to Neher who will probably stay on in Indonesia
after the other Dutch Ministers return and who is supposed to be
liberal. I can only say from my questions he is not.