My immediately preceding telegram [1] sets out the Dutch position
on the truce plan. Today Van Zeeland [2], Graham and self
discussed informally the crisis which had developed and the Dutch
memorandum.

2. Van Zeeland argued strongly that the Republic must accept what
it can get now in order to preserve its position. He claims that
reference back to the Security Council will not help the Republic
and that in the latter's interest the Committee must seek an
immediate armistice on the best terms the Dutch will give and
press on with substantive talks immediately after with a view to
improving the Republic position. He has promised me a detailed
statement of his views tomorrow which I shall summarize and cable.

[3] It follows that he would accept the Dutch paper with some
further tightening up of provisions to assist the Republic.

3. Graham's position is still uncertain. He would, I think, go
along with me on a strong report but is inclined to be swayed by
Van Zeeland's arguments. The latter has thrown in for good measure
a threat of resignation but only to Graham. Scott put little faith
in further action by the Security Council except in the event of
another police action.

4. Clearly, we are at the cross roads and an early decision will
have to be made as to whether we are to continue a strong line
through to the Security Council or whether we should compromise
and continue to seek a minimum status for the Republic. The
decision will obviously depend on what we can expect from the
Council and I should appreciate information and instructions as
early as practicable. You will no doubt consider the very real
desirability of Kirby returning immediately (before Christmas) in
view of the crucial situation this week. This would encourage
Graham and perhaps Van Zeeland.

5. I shall endeavour to keep the position fluid but failing
contrary instructions from you will proceed on the following
basis:-

(a) As the cease fire resolution offers the best opportunity for
strengthening the 1st November position, that reply [4] [of] the
Netherlands special committee on truce plan unsatisfactory. It
contains far too many opportunities to crucify the Republic and I
do not see how we can put any faith in the good intentions of the
Dutch. The main dangers are in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 10 and 14 of my
previous telegram. In particular proposals for demilitarized zones
would provide the Netherlands with just the opportunity they would
seek to claim that the Republic was failing to observe the
armistice and they would be able (perhaps even on evidence of the
Committee) to justify further military action. I believe that we
must seek at all costs to ensure that the demilitarized zones are
really demilitarized and that under international authority.

(b) That we must, therefore, continue to push for acceptance of
the truce plan.

(c) That as a last resort we could agree to accept the Van Mook
line as a demarcation line on the basis that areas between Van
Mook's line and positions occupied on 4th August would constitute
demilitarized zones and with the express provision that this was
without prejudice to the Security Council resolutions on the cease
fire. There is every indication that the Dutch are adamant about
the Van Mook line and it would be a pity if we allowed the
Republic to go under while we haggled over temporary or even semi
permanent status of these territories.

(d) That we press on with report to the Security Council. The
draft prepared today was unsatisfactory. It was not full enough to
show the Netherlands tactics of delay. Unfortunately a fuller
report will mean an extra day or two for preparation and it will
be too bulky to telegraph. We shall endeavour to have it sent by
air mail to reach New York by 29th December, and have a summarized
version telegraphed on completion more than 72 hours in advance.

Neither the Americans nor the Belgians wish to hurry and there is
added burden of new important material which has been received
over the weekend.

(e) That I recommend in report if necessary as a minority-
(1) That the Netherlands be instructed by the Council to accept
unconditionally the Committee's truce plan.

(2) That in the event of disagreement between parties they shall
accept suggestions of the Committee regarding demilitarized zones.

(3) That both parties shall agree to the Committee's making
suggestions for the administration of the demilitarized zones.

(4) That in the event of disagreement between the parties they
shall accept the Committee's proposals for the administration of
the demilitarized zones.

(I am only convinced that we must seek at all costs international
control of demilitarized zones. The proposal of joint police force
under the control of a military assistant of the Committee seems
particularly appropriate. In this event additional military staff
would be required from Australia among others.)
(f) As an alternative to (e) and only if the Americans will not
come with me, it may be preferable to leave these recommendations
to our representative on the Council.

6. I should appreciate summary of debates in the Council.

7. Sjarifoeddin's letter on West Java Conference and Beel's speech
was received today. It was along the lines of paragraph 4 of my
telegram K.24 [5] and included a request that the contents be
forwarded to the Security Council. Van Zeeland on basis of
paragraph 2 of this telegram thought the letter most ill advised.