Sjarifoeddin told me last night that a telegram from the
Republic's representative in London confirmed advice given by
Grey. [1]

2. Prime Minister Beel last night in Sumatra made a 'last appeal'
to the Republic for co-operation in formation of a federative
United States of Indonesia. [2]

3. Yesterday, a West Java Conference held under the auspices of
the Dutch adopted a resolution to form a West Java Provisional
Government based on the status of a state to be established in a
third conference. The conference also called upon the central
Government to transfer as soon as possible the rights and
authority to govern to the West Java Provisional Government. Van
Mook has publicly agreed today to band over rights and authority
to govern as soon as possible and has indicated 'the precursor of
hopes itself' will shortly be organised. [3]

4. These developments clearly demonstrate that the Committee is
being by-passed and that a serious crisis which threatens the
existence of the Republic is close at hand. I am endeavouring to
ensure that Sjarifoeddin makes a strong statement to the Committee
and to the press along the following lines.

(a) That the action taken by the Security Council following the
police action was taken without prejudice to the rights, claims or
position of the parties. The Dutch are disregarding the Security
Council's resolutions by taking action which is seriously
prejudicing the position of the Republic and in fact ignores the
Republic.

(b) That the cease hostilities resolution of the Security Council
should mean a political and [4] cease fire.

(c) That the Netherlands are by-passing the Committee of Good
Offices which is in Java with the agreement of both parties for
the express purpose of assisting in a settlement of the dispute.

The Committee is in danger of being presented with a fait accompli
[in] which the political status of the island will have been
organised by the Dutch without the co-operation of the Republic or
the Committee.

(d) That West Java Conference was a puppet conference under the
Dutch and was completely undemocratic and contrary to the spirit
and agreement of Linggadjati which the Republic accepts and of
which the Netherlands claim to accept the underlying principles.

(West Java Conference was called by Recomba, that is, the
Administrative officer directly responsible to Van Mook.

Invitations to attend were sent out in the name of representatives
of the Netherlands East Indies Government and these
representatives were selected by a contact committee which had
been formed by an earlier conference called by Recomba in the same
way. Since the first conference agreed that it was not completely
representative of the people the contact committee which chose the
second conference was clearly not democratic.)
(e) That Prime Minister Beel's 'last appeal' makes it appear that
the Republic is being uncooperative [when] in fact the records of
the Committee of Good Offices will show clearly that it is the
Netherlands and not the Republic which is uncooperative and is
delaying implementation of the Security Council's resolution. More
than a fortnight ago the Republic accepted unconditionally the
Committee's plan for a speedy and effective truce [5] whereas the
Netherlands have not yet done so.

(f) That on the same day as Prime Minister Beel made his
statement, the Netherlands were ignoring the Republic in
permitting the setting up of a puppet state in territory which
under their own interpretation of Linggadjati was under de facto
authority of the Republic.

(g) That although Security Council recognises the Republic as one
of two parties in dispute, the Netherlands are completely ignoring
them in their political proposals for Java, Sumatra and Madura.

This is greatly upsetting the atmosphere for the Renville talks
and if it continues there is little possibility of talks being
successful.

(h) That the Republic re-asserts its firm intention of continuing
co-operation to the full with the Committee of Good Offices and
the Security Council of the United Nations in an endeavour to
reach just settlement of the dispute. As an assurance of its good
faith, it agrees to accept unconditionally the verdict of the
United Nations in this matter.

5. On the basis of this statement I could make a strong appeal in
the Committee that our report should deal with the issues raised
by Sjarifoeddin. I fear, however, that it will be practically
impossible to get agreement on this as even the Americans are
anxious that the report should not deal with controversial issues
and should avoid as far as possible evoking discussions in the
Security Council. After further sounding out the Americans, I
shall, if necessary, threaten a minority report which would
indicate that while Australia would do everything possible to
continue assistance in settlement of the dispute, the Committee
must either have co-operation of the Netherlands or more clear
definition of powers essential to accomplish anything. In
particular I might also ask for clarification whether unilateral
political action of the Netherlands is consistent with the
resolution of the Security Council.

6. At the same time, it would probably be dangerous if I were to
carry this threat into effect against strong opposition of the
Americans. Unless we had the vote of the United States any
proposal would presumably be defeated in the Security Council and
defeat of resolution now would be potential encouragement for the
Netherlands to fulfil their federal plan and reopen police action
at the first favourable opportunity. I shall, therefore, await
your instructions which I should be glad to have by tomorrow
evening before taking final action.

7. Our best course if the Americans will not agree to a strong
report may be to endeavour to get as much appropriate factual
material as possible in the report leaving it to our
representative on the Council to use the report and Sjarifoeddin's
statement etc. to the fullest extent practicable in terms of the
feelings of other members. My personal opinion, of course, is that
the Committee must be given more powers if it is to be of use and
that the Netherlands must receive an early and heavy jolt from the
Council.

8. Other matters worth your consideration are-
(a) Whether Sjarifoeddin should be encouraged to make a direct
appeal to the Security Council along the lines in paragraph 4.

(b) Whether it would be possible as a minimum precaution to obtain
a resolution from the Council instructing the Netherlands that it
must on no account whatever extend its police action.

(c) In the event of the worst happening, what steps could be taken
to ensure an Emigre Government. In the event of further police
action the Republicans intended to fly from Djokjakarta to Sumatra
and bought an Anson plane for th[at] purpose. Unfortunately the
plane crashed in Sumatra.