(a) Cease Fire Interpretation
(1) The G.O.C. agreed unanimously today [1] that 'Territory which
was not occupied or controlled on August 4th' is territory which
on August 4th was not 'actually under authority of the hostile
army'. Occupation or control on August 4th, within the meaning of
the resolution of November 1st, did not 'extend' to territory
where such authority 'had not been established' and could not 'be
exercised' effectively without 'movement of armed forces of one
party in any direction, which movement might reasonably be
expected to provoke retaliatory action by other party'.

The occupation or control by either party of any territory which
was not occupied or controlled as defined above on August 4th is
inconsistent with the resolutions of August 1st and November 1st.

Steps for rectification should proceed as quickly as possible in
accordance with the truce plan submitted by the Committee to both
parties for determination of the demilitarised zone.

(2) Herremans, in agreeing, made proviso that Van Zeeland might
over-rule him. Graham then made clear that in this eventuality he
would (word apparently omitted) majority decision on basis of
stronger definitions agreed to by the United States and ourselves.

I also stated that if the plan was not accepted I would move that
the parties be asked whether they would withdraw to positions
occupied on August 4th.

(3) I understand that Tamzil in conversation with the Chinese
Consul-General was told orally that China would not oppose the
Dutch having to move back from the present perimeters if the
Republic agreed to arming of Pau An Tui. [2] Tamzil has asked for
information in writing and the Consul-General has invited him to
work out details together. The importance of this development if
the matter, as I expect, goes to the Security Council is obvious.

(b) Political Talks
(1) Beginning today the G.O.C. will hold formal but closed
political discussions with each of the parties on alternative
days. This will put on record the position of the Netherlands
delegation which today reveal to the surprise only of the
Americans that there was no real agreement at Linggadjati.

Netherlands position is that the text of the Agreement is entirely
subject to later elucidations of the Commission-General,
Parliament, and Official Netherlands correspondence. [3] For
example, clause 1 of the Agreement is regarded by the Netherlands
as recognition of Republic . . . only to give them a chance to
prove that as a Government they could exercise authority over
certain territories in a democratic way. The absurdity of this
position is brought out by the fact that the Netherlands
Delegation states that interpretations were in the minds of the
Commission-General when it initialled the Agreement.

(2) I have tabled a working document suggesting a proposal on the
United States-Philippines pattern. [4] The United States, however,
are determined to go ahead exploring the positions of the parties,
using Linggadjati as agenda. Apart from the delay which is now
inevitable, I cannot see that this matters, particularly as the
Netherlands were obviously embarrassed by the Committee's
questions today. When after a week or 10 days it becomes obvious
that there is no basis for agreement, the Committee will have to
propose to all [5] parties that it make suggestions. If accepted
this will provide the best opportunity of pressing our views; if
rejected there would be no alternative to reference back to the
Security Council, although I realise that from our point of view
this may be too late.

(c) Possible Second Police Action
A major pre-occupation at present is to thwart a second and final
Police Action which is by no means out of the question,
particularly when the Dutch hear of hardening attitude of the
Committee. I hope to report on this tomorrow when I expect to have
fuller information.

(d) Miscellaneous
Van Vredenburch told us today it was not yet decided whether
Jonkman would come to Indonesia.