Extracts BATAVIA, 7 December 1947

TOP SECRET

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CEASE FIRE COMMITTEES FROM 15TH
NOVEMBER TO 6TH DECEMBER 1947

[matter omitted]

4. During the course of discussions it became abundantly clear
that the Dutch did not intend to withdraw to the areas they
occupied on August 4th nor to abandon freedom of police action
behind their forward positions.

To meet this situation the Australian Delegation prepared a plan.

(See document S/AC.10/CONF.1/9 dated 3 December 1947. [1]) It was
the original intention of the Australian Delegation that the
parties should be asked beforehand whether they would accept
decisions of the Special Representatives as to where the
demilitarized zone should be, having listened to and considered
the arguments of both parties. This idea was, however,
unacceptable to the U.S. and Belgian Delegations as they felt it
would bring a blank refusal from the Dutch.

The Special Representatives are now awaiting replies from the two
parties to this plan which was communicated to them by letter. [2]

One advantage of the plan is that if it is accepted by both
parties the Dutch will not be able to cross the demilitarized zone
and destroy the Republic without bringing some form of
international action down on their head. In addition it sets an
irreducible minimum for the territories of the Republic which the
Dutch cannot enter without permission. This territory can be
expanded by agreement on the political issues; it cannot be
contracted unless the Republic collapses. The possibility of
obtaining de jure sovereignty for this area should be borne in
mind in certain circumstances. In any event the economic position
of the Republic would have to be most carefully examined for
through the police action far the greater part of the economically
valuable territory (especially in Java) has been occupied or by-
passed.

Another problem arises in connection with the plan, namely the
control of the demilitarized zone. As at present advised the
Australian Delegation thinks that the overall control should be in
the hands of the three Senior Military Officers of the three
nations acting either as a committee or as responsible for
separate areas. These officers would have at their disposal a
joint police force commanded in one case by a Netherlands and in
the other a Republican official.

A reply is awaited from the Dutch as to whether they accept the
plan. The Indonesians have stated it is acceptable to them.

[matter omitted]

6. Following a request from the Republic to investigate the
situation on Madoera [consequent on] [3] recent Dutch action, the
Committee has requested the Netherlands to advise whether they
have occupied positions in Madoera beyond those occupied on August
4th, also to send observers there.

Although the Australian Delegation realizes that the feelings of
the Madoerese and the economic situation will redound in the Dutch
favour, there seems little doubt that it can be proved that the
Dutch have violated the Cease Fire Resolution.

7. The Dutch are building up a secret file with the Committee of
alleged breaches of the Cease Fire. This will no doubt be used at
a later date.

8. There is no doubt that the Dutch have succeeded in mopping up
and dispersing many of the Republican areas of resistance behind
their lines [in Java especially]. [4] It is more than doubtful,
[however] [5], that their contention that no such areas exist can
be proved. [6] In any event it can be proved that they have
occupied positions beyond those occupied on August 4th in many
instances and over large areas.

9. The tactic of the Australian delegation has been and is either
to get the Dutch to agree to reasonable solutions; if not, to
place their refusals on record for subsequent reports to the
Security Council.

There is no doubt that the position of the G.O.C. [7] under the
Security Council Resolution[s] is much stronger on the Cease
Hostilities question than on the Political Discussions.