PART THREE [1]

7. Very confidentially I have sent Critchley to Jogjakarta today
to discuss with the Prime Minister the advisability of making a
written appeal to the Committee to consider urgently-
(1) Measures to provide for equitable distribution of food and
clothing under international control throughout areas in which de
facto authority of the Republic was recognised by the Netherlands
before military action of July 21st; and
(2) Measures to relieve interruption of economic relations and
communications of the Republic imposed by force of the
Netherlands, this letter including reference to naval blockade.

8. If the Republic take this step it will state-
(A) Its gratitude to the Security Council for its intervention and
for various resolutions passed by it;

(B) Its appreciation of the work of the Committee of Good Offices;

(C) Assurance that it will continue to assist and obey the Council
and the Committee in every possible way;

(D) Its understanding that measures to cease hostilities taken by
the Council have been provisional measures taken 'without
prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties' and
have been directed to the breach of the peace initiated by the
Dutch in July;

(E) That 'police action' had the aim of crushing Republican
resistance by cutting off from it the main food producing areas of
Java and Sumatra;

(F) Because of timely action taken by the Council that the Dutch
were unable to achieve complete military domination of the Island
but that they did succeed in gaining control of the main economic
areas before August 4th;

(G) Because (A) to (F) above, delay in reaching an overall
political settlement and implementation of the cease fire will
consolidate for the Dutch their economic gains and the inevitable
weakness of the Republic, they will add that the economic blockade
which the Dutch are now imposing will create extreme distress and
possibly starvation within areas controlled by the Republic and
will prejudice a proper appreciation of the political situation in
the Island and seriously hamper proper and impartial judgment.

9. The present plan I had in mind was that this plea on economic
and humanitarian grounds would reach the Committee at the same
time as it was considering the question of reporting back to the
Security Council on the cease fire and I was wondering whether it
would not help to secure justice [for] the Republic [i]f the
Committee remitted both matters to the Security Council. Further I
was considering the advisability of endeavouring to have sent on
to the Security Council economic and humanitarian plea in any
event.

10. If you could give me your opinion on the above matters as a
matter of urgency I would be greatly assisted. In this connection
you will appreciate that the ship should be here December 2nd [2]
and on present indications only refusal by the Dutch could prevent
bona fide commencement of substantive discussions on that date. In
this connection I think the Republic would be willing to give an
unqualified undertaking to cease fire and stand fast pending
Security Council action on reference to it of the cease fire and
economic and humanitarian plea. I would also like your opinion as
to whether the Republic should give such an undertaking. I feel
they should and thus proclaim absolute reliance and dependence on
receiving justice from the United Nations.

11. I should have added above that my main reason for thinking the
Republic should make humanitarian plea now was that by so doing
they will use the economic position created by Dutch aggression as
an affirmative plea for justice rather than have to rely upon it
as a sort of explanation for the Dutch case that the Republic have
lost and the Dutch have gained considerable support of local
populations. This latter as I have said before is obviously due to
economic pressure and bribery. It is true I think that it is only
temporary but it would be difficult to substantiate this if the
Republic merely raised it as a sort of defence and if the Republic
has to use the fact at all it would be better by way of attack
than defence.

1[2]. I appreciate the views of the Prime Minister in your
telegram 362 [3] and as you know, have been always most anxious to
get the cease fire position back to the Security Council one way
or another. Unfortunately I am only one of three, but I have been
doing my best in this connection. I will certainly suggest to the
Committee at the meeting tomorrow that it act in accordance with
paragraph one of your telegram 362. In support I will use the
terms of August 1st resolution requiring the parties to 'keep the
Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement'.

1[3]. The Republic, in asking the Committee to refer the cease
fire deadlock and humanitarian plea to the Security Council, would
of course intimate that it was immediately prepared to commence
substantive discussions on the ship, and would argue that,
provided food were distributed under international supervision,
the necessary air of tranquillity so often mentioned up here would
be provided for such discussions.

14. Could you please hasten urgently the despatch of Paludrine
Tablets.