Historical documents
Cablegram 412,
MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET PERSONAL
Interpretation of Security Council resolution of November 1st has
been debated by Committee with Americans and ourselves making some
progress against limited interpretation of penultimate paragraph
[1] by Van Zeeland. Strategy of seeking best possible basis for
showdown had required me to accept an interim compromise agreement
regarding establishment of demarcation line expressed by following
quote agreement.
Secret document. For use only by members of Committee so that each
member will give identical reply at this stage to questions that
may be separately asked of him by representatives of either party.
. . . [A]t this stage the Committee is not yet in a position to
offer suggestions; it has been informed of views expressed by
military advisers on November 10th 1947, namely that opinion
expressed by military advisers on October 2nd 1947 should be made
to conform to the resolution of November 1st. [2] In addition to
other reasons, the express reference made by them to the
resolution of the Security Council November 1st, 1947, makes it
necessary to come to a clear interpretation of the will of the
Council as expressed in the resolution. Such interpretation can
best be made by the Committee of Good Offices with the help of
verbatim records of the meetings of the Security Council. In the
meantime, considering that the rights and claims of either party
could not possibly be prejudiced, modified or jeopardised, it is
hoped that the parties will forthwith take steps to come to an
agreement on any practical solution which might meet their views.
2. It would be of great assistance to me if you would pass this
telegram on to the Minister personally at New York with a view to
my obtaining precise instructions by telegram signed by him which
I may pass to other members of the Committee as authority for
Australian understanding that the resolution requires withdrawal
of the Dutch forces to their positions of August 4th and also to
my obtaining concise definitions of the terms in the resolution
such as 'the use of armed forces', 'hostile action', 'control',
'territory not occupied'. I understand privately that the
Americans are telegraphing for similar definitions and it may be
possible for you to arrange replies agreeing with those of the
State Department. In particular the definition 'hostile action'
will be hotly contested by the Dutch who will probably claim
peaceful penetration. It seems reasonable however to define
hostile action as action contrary to the wishes of the other
party.
(5. [3]) No doubt you will have been studying the attitude of
France [4] and I should be glad of your appreciation of the
position from time to time for my own personal background
information.
(6.) In confidence, the Americans have hinted that the United
States will apply strongest pressure on the Netherlands. You may
also be able to give me personal information on this subject.
(3.) Present indications are that the Dutch may refuse obedience
to the November 1st resolution interpreted as above and may even
bluntly inform the Committee to that effect. In that event Graham
and I are discussing whether the Committee should report such
refusal to the Security Council in either of two events:
1. That the Committee unanimously adopts such interpretation; or
2. That it does so by a majority, Zeeland dissenting.
The Minister's views on this would be welcomed.
(4.) Van Zeeland has agreed that the failure by the Committee to
reach a political settlement and reference back to the Security
Council will provoke the veto. If there is to be a deadlock this
justifies our endeavouring to ensure that it occurred in the best
possible circumstances and concern[ing] the November 1st
resolution where our position is strongest.
7. The Republican Delegation has just arrived in Batavia for the
first meeting on the cease fire resolutions with the Dutch at 1630
hours today. The Committee under my chairmanship will open the
meeting but will leave two delegations to talk with each other and
representatives from the three nations on a technical level. [5]
(The Committee is attempting to reach unanimity of interpretation
of the November 1st resolution but in my view Van Zeeland will not
yield and certainly the remaining two will not, unless contrary to
advice received in reply to our respective telegrams mentioned in
paragraph two of this telegram.)
8. Your personal telegram [6] very much appreciated and I will
further discuss with Graham suggestion of progressive report to
Council. He rather thinks Council will only welcome reference to
it on clear cut issues. Perhaps the Minister may give his opinion
on this.
[AA:A1838/283, 403/3/1/1, xii]