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373 Department of External Affairs to Australian Delegation, United Nations

Cablegram 612 CANBERRA, 13 October 1947

MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET

Your UN.966, Security [5]02. [1] Indonesia.

1. We feel that your resolution in its present form is not
sufficiently realistic in terms of the actual situation in Java to
provide effective observance of cease fire order, even if it were
adopted by Council.

2. Reports from our military observers in Indonesia [2] confirm
that positions of opposing troops on and since August 1st (date of
Council decision) have been such that there is nothing in the
nature of a line of demarcation, and withdrawal of five kilometres
by both sides would be academic. Situation on 1st August was that
the Dutch troops had advanced at various points into Republican
territory, leaving pockets of Republican troops, both regular and
guerilla, between and behind their spearheads. Consular report
which you should have by now [3] indicates that it has been Dutch
attempt to mop up these pockets since cease-fire order, and
Republican determination to 'stand fast', that have led to
continued disregard of cease-fire order.

3. It is thus differing interpretations placed by Dutch and
Indonesians on Security Council's order to 'cease hostilities
forthwith', which is at the root of the matter. Complete
withdrawal to positions before hostilities is only the real
solution from military point of view. If decision along these
lines not possible, we consider that better proposal would be for
Council to call upon both sides to 'stand fast' in present
positions, and, at the same time make it clear that this order
means the prohibiting of armed land and air patrols and of
mopping-up operations. It also means cessation of activities of
irregular bands.

1 Document 371.

2 See Documents 360 and 369.

3 See Document 372.


[AA:A1838/274, 854/10/4, iii]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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