I have a letter from Teppema [2] referring to conversations with
you and asking me to convey a message that Van Boetzelaer will not
be at New York, but it is hoped that you will have a free
discussion with Van Roijen, Netherlands Ambassador at Ottawa, whom
you met at San Francisco. Teppema then goes on to say that he
would welcome better relations between our two countries but these
have suffered a further set-back as a result of the impetuous
attitude of the Australian representative at the Security Council
and the somewhat tactless approach of Mr. Eaton. He has asked to
see the Prime Minister on these latter matters. Hodgson needs no
defence, and Eaton has acted most correctly and in conjunction
with other Consuls and only after full recognition was accorded
him from The Hague.

2. Van Mook will be at New York. It seems clear that no decision
was taken at The Hague as to whether Djokjakarta should be
occupied and Van Mook is now endeavouring to find out how far they
can count on United States support for any action they might take.

You will have seen Van Mook's press statement couched in most
provocative and unfair terms. [3] The tactics of Teppema
correspond to his tactics immediately prior to the last Dutch
move, and I fear an attempt to prepare the ground by making
accusations against us and by winning United States-United Kingdom
support for another move. These were their tactics on the last
occasion.

3. This may place you personally in an awkward position at New
York as any sympathy shown by you will be wrongly interpreted.

4. The need for Dutch haste is now greater, because the Consuls,
on Eaton's initiative, are penetrating into areas previously
closed by the Dutch from observation. Eaton's first report [4] is
in my immediately following telegram. [5] It gives a totally
different picture of the position in the interior and the strength
of the Republican movement than that given by the Dutch.

Supporting him is a report from Ballard [which] states that in
Batavia itself there are several thousand Republican officials
actually starving because they will not co-operate in the new
Dutch administration. [6] The Dutch have given these men the
choice of working for them or of being denied all facilities for
living. Eaton's report is supported by the French, and, if similar
reports of Republican support are made by United States and United
Kingdom, the Dutch position will be impossible. All this, in my
view, supports other signs that they are anticipating further
military action.

5. Dening informs me that the 'cease fire' order caught the Dutch
in an awkward position, and, on purely military grounds, they must
either withdraw or move ahead. Withdrawal could be accomplished
only with great losses (see paragraph 2 of Eaton's report [7]).

Dening is convinced the Dutch will start a military move, doing
what they can do to offset the political reactions which would
follow any further military measures.