Your 299. [1]

While the general report is most satisfactory, the greatest care
must be taken in placing it before the Consular mission at this
early stage. You are stating as a fact many matters with which
your colleagues will disagree, bring[ing] to bear their longer
experience and endeavouring to discredit your observations if they
are not consistent with the reports they have already sent to
their Governments. It would seem to us preferable that you should
make no report to the Consular group, and certainly not to the
Security Council, until each one of you is in a position to make a
full report. You must realise that it is not merely a matter of
reporting on facts as far as some other Governments are concerned.

They will be interested only in obtaining support for their
political theories already formulated.

2. The schedule set out in your 301 [2] is suitable to us. The
four military officers are Brigadier L.G.H. Dyke, Major D.L.

Campbell, Squadron Leader L.T. Spence, and Commander H.S.

Chesterman. We assume you will have arranged entry and we do not
propose asking for visas.

3. Information we now have would suggest that 'cease fire' caught
Dutch unexpectedly and, far from achieving all their military
objectives, they are at present in a position from which they must
either advance or withdraw. Withdrawal will mean very heavy
casualties as implied in your paragraph 2 of 299. Consequently,
there has been the attempt to obtain permission to advance which
is probably politically impossible. Without mentioning matter to
your colleagues, your primary objective at the moment should be to
make a withdrawal possible without loss to the Dutch. It seems
likely that the Dutch would be willing to withdraw their troops at
the request of the Consular group, who would recommend this as the
only effective means of maintaining the 'cease fire', if they had
an assurance that their withdrawal would not be resisted. on the
other hand, the Indonesians would be prepared to give some such
undertaking if the Consular group gave some assurances as to the
positions to which forces would be withdrawn. It would be
necessary to arrange direct with the Indonesians for detailed
instructions for their forces, and it would probably be necessary
for the Consular group, or at least the Australian members, to be
on the spot during the withdrawal. It seems to us that such a move
is not only essential if the 'cease fire' is to be maintained, but
is also a necessary preliminary before any mediation.

Glad of your comment on this aspect. [3]