Reports suggest that Republican authorities may not accept
mediation by America, but will ask for mediation by a number of
nations. [1] In the terms of the Council resolution they are not
obliged to accept America merely because America is-acceptable to
the Dutch. Probably they will want India associated with the
mediation.

2. We are endeavouring to get a message through indicating that we
would be glad to be associated with any mediation [2], and we are
also endeavouring to persuade the Dutch that, in the interests of
a reasonable settlement and in order to prevent the matter being
referred again to the Security Council, they might be well advised
to accept the Indonesian suggestions on mediation and take the
initiative in suggesting to the United States that the United
States and Australia act as mediator[s]. [3]

3. The Dutch action in making more landings after the Security
Council decision has done tremendous harm. The Dutch, not the
Security Council, set the time for 'cease fire' and not until a
considerable time after the decision of the Security Council that
there should be an immediate cessation. There will therefore be a
strong demand that the Dutch at least return to the positions held
at the time of the Security Council decision.

4. Mediation will obviously commence in a situation of tenseness,
the Dutch encouraged to believe that they can retain what they now
hold, and the Indonesians charging members of the Security Council
with bad faith and playing into the hands of the Dutch.

5. The Americans cannot handle the situation. They don't know the
parties to the dispute, nor do they know at first hand the many
difficulties involved. They know only the Dutch point of view, and
the reaction in Australia and India and in other countries is
likely to be most unfavourable to active American participation,
particularly when the commencing point is one greatly prejudicing
the Indonesian interests.

6. The situation is likely to develop again in such a way as to
require us to refer the matter to the Security Council again or
raise the matter in the Assembly. We cannot be content with the
present decision of the Security Council, but must follow it
through until there is a just and lasting settlement. Our own
security interests require that.

7. We would be prepared, however, to take the present situation as
it stands and use our good offices with the Indonesians to secure
their co-operation in mediation, if the United States Government
would agree to joint United States-Australian mediation.

This would be acceptable to the Indonesians, and the Dutch should
be able to see that the alternative is a demand for Indian and
other participation, or perhaps a reference again to the Security
Council. They know that we are interested in their position in
this area, and, in fact, our action in the Security Council was
not unrelated to our desire to find a solution other than the
complete expulsion of the Dutch which is likely to be the final
result of their unwise attitude. Moreover, it is clear to us that
mediation by America alone is doomed to failure, and we find it
hard to believe that America would undertake mediation which has
little or no prospect of success and little or no prospect of
support from the main countries interested in Indonesia.

8. An immediate joint offer to both parties (and without
endeavouring to find if this is acceptable to one of the parties)
of joint mediation would have a tremendously encouraging effect in
following up the decision of the Security Council, and we, for our
part, feel confident that we are in a position to make the
difference between success and failure in mediation.

9. Hodgson will be tied up in New York, but, if at all
practicable, he might visit Washington and join with the
Ambassador and the Minister in an approach at the highest level in
the State Department and to all those who might be responsible in
making a decision. If it is not possible for Hodgson to [leave]
New York, he will put this point of view forward to the United
States representative there, leaving the Ambassador and the
Minister to take similar action at Washington.

10. Please act as soon as possible on this telegram and report in
detail all reactions, as we are endeavouring to co-ordinate this
move in discussions both with the Indonesians and Dutch. We have
not advised the United Kingdom Government of the move, because,
throughout the whole of these negotiations, there seems to have
been an attempt to exclude us, in spite of most direct appeals and
protests. Nor are we informing the Indian Government, for, while
we want to keep close touch with them on this matter, they
appeared to resent our taking the matter out of their hands at the
Security Council and will, no doubt, be wanting themselves to be
associated with the American offer of mediation, and perhaps they
have already taken action to this end.

11. Please make a special endeavour to help us carry through this
proposal.