When presenting a note to the Dutch Minister [1] yesterday
explaining action we were to take, he said, speaking off the
record, that the objection to the Indonesians was not that they
broke one part of the Agreement [2], but they were incapable of
fulfilling any part. An examination of the Agreement makes this
difficult to understand. He went on to say that, in May, when he
was in Holland, the matter was discussed by the Government, and
three courses seemed open. Firstly, that the Dutch get out of the
Netherlands East Indies, and this was regarded as impossible, as
it was vital to Holland. Second, that the matter be referred to
the United Nations. This was impossible because the matter was
urgent and the United Nations was renowned for delay. Third, that
attempts would be made to extend the area of Dutch influence in
order to make it an economic unit.

2. Throughout the negotiations, we have always felt that, each
time the Indone-sians compromised, the Dutch increased their
demands. We had the feeling that, in fact, they wanted to make
acceptance of the Agreement impossible, and the break over police
arrangements would be evidence of this, as police arrangements of
the kind they insisted upon were not contemplated in the
Agreement.

3. Moreover, the disposition of their Navy and forces at the time
of commencement of hostilities would seem to indicate that weeks,
if not months before, action of this kind was contemplated.

4. You will have at New York the strongest Dutch propaganda as we
have here. Their Information Service pulls no punches and is
highly organised and co-ordinated with diplomatic policy. On the
other hand, there will be no Indonesian Information Service, and,
surprisingly quickly, you will find acceptance of Dutch assertions
of lack of co-operation by Indonesians. We have officially
absolutely no evidence of lack of co-operation, in spite of
numerous enquiries and also of a number of personal contacts, as,
for example, the four who were in Indonesia previously. Forsyth
will confirm this.

5. This information, given, I think, objectively, may be of
assistance to you in your conversations with delegates at New
York. It may be important, that, even though merits are not being
considered, they should realise the issue is not one-sided as they
might think, subject as they will be to persistent and effective
propaganda against Asiatic peoples. Incidentally, Indonesian
leaders and members of the Administration, as Forsyth will
confirm, are well educated, restrained men, who have won the
wholehearted respect of Killearn, who was acting as a third party
at the time the Agreement was made.